ST. ANDREWS UNIVERSITY
inseparable from the individual who knows it, so that to conceive
this individual as non-existent is ipsofacto to conceive what he
knows as non-existent. On this view, if I suppose that I now
cease to exist, I must, on so supposing, also suppose that the sheet
of paper which I am perceiving ceases to exist. This is not
and could not be what Ferrier really intends to assert. None
the less it is what the wording of his primary proposition in-
evitably suggests. What he says is that " Along with whatever
any intelligence knows it must . . . have some cognisance of
itself." The reference is to itselfonly, and not to any other self.
But the assertion that the self must be known along with
whatever else it knows is not distinguished by Ferrier from the
essentially different assertion that the self and what it knows are
apprehended as inseparable. Hence it is natural to assume that
in this proposition also the reference is to the individual subject.
What is meant is naturally assumed to be, that when I know
anything other than myself, the being of what I know is
inseparable from my own knowledge of it.
But this interpretation is expressly and emphatically dis-
claimed by Ferrier in the sequel, and it is quite incompatible
with his philosophy as a whole. In what purports to be a strict
deduction from the original proposition, we find what we took
to be the meaning of this proposition covertly transformed. It
turns out that what Ferrier holds to be inconceivable is not the
existence of objects apart from their being known by this or
that individual, but their existence as unknown to any mind.
A's knowing them or B's knowing them is apprehended by A
or B only as a special case or instance in which this general
condition is fulfilled. Thus, if we take as an example some
material thing, such as a tree, what Ferrier really intends to say
is that the tree cannot be thought as existing unperceived. He
does not intend to say that it cannot be thought as existing
unperceived by me or by you. Just as any particular colour
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