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ST. ANDREWS UNIVERSITY inseparable from the individual who knows it, so that to conceive this individual as non-existent is ipsofacto to conceive what he knows as non-existent. On this view, if I suppose that I now cease to exist, I must, on so supposing, also suppose that the sheet of paper which I am perceiving ceases to exist. This is not and could not be what Ferrier really intends to assert. None the less it is what the wording of his primary proposition in- evitably suggests. What he says is that " Along with whatever any intelligence knows it must . . . have some cognisance of itself." The reference is to itselfonly, and not to any other self. But the assertion that the self must be known along with whatever else it knows is not distinguished by Ferrier from the essentially different assertion that the self and what it knows are apprehended as inseparable. Hence it is natural to assume that in this proposition also the reference is to the individual subject. What is meant is naturally assumed to be, that when I know anything other than myself, the being of what I know is inseparable from my own knowledge of it. But this interpretation is expressly and emphatically dis- claimed by Ferrier in the sequel, and it is quite incompatible with his philosophy as a whole. In what purports to be a strict deduction from the original proposition, we find what we took to be the meaning of this proposition covertly transformed. It turns out that what Ferrier holds to be inconceivable is not the existence of objects apart from their being known by this or that individual, but their existence as unknown to any mind. A's knowing them or B's knowing them is apprehended by A or B only as a special case or instance in which this general condition is fulfilled. Thus, if we take as an example some material thing, such as a tree, what Ferrier really intends to say is that the tree cannot be thought as existing unperceived. He does not intend to say that it cannot be thought as existing unperceived by me or by you. Just as any particular colour 162

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