326 INSTITUTES OF THE BOOK II.
man inexcusable, and may be not improperly defined — the
judgment of conscience distinguishing sufficiently between
just and unjust, and by convicting men on their own testi
mony, depriving them of all pretext for ignorance. So indul
gent is man toward himself, that, wiiile doing evil, he always
endeavours as much as he can to suppress the idea of sin.
It was this, apparently, which induced Plato (in his Prota
goras) to suppose that sins were committed only through
ignorance. There might be some ground for this, if hypocrisy
were so successful in hiding vice as to keep the conscience
clear in the sight of God. But since the sinner, when trying
to evade the judgment of good and evil implanted in him, is
ever and anon dragged forward, and not permitted to wink
so effectually as not to be compelled at times, whether he
will or not, to open his eyes, it is false to say that he sins
only through ignorance.
23. Themistius is more accurate in teaching, (Paraphr. in
Lib. iii. de Anima, cap. xlvi.,) that the intellect is very sel
dom mistaken in the general definition or essence of the
matter ; but that deception begins as it advances farther,
namely, when it descends to particulars. That homicide,
putting the case in the abstract, is an evil, no man will deny;
and yet one who is conspiring the death of his enemy
deliberates on it as if the thing was good. The adulterer
wrill condemn adultery in the abstract, and yet flatter himself
while privately committing it. The ignorance lies here : that
man, when he comes to the particular, forgets the rule which
he had laid down in the general case. Augustine treats most
admirably on this subject in his exposition of the first
verse of the fifty-seventh Psalm. The doctrine of Themistius,
however, does not always hold true : for the turpitude of the
crime sometimes presses so on the conscience, that the sinner
does not impose upon himself by a false semblance of good,
but rushes into sin knowingly and willingly. Hence the
expression, — I see the better course, and approve it : I follow
the worse, (Medea of Ovid.) For this reason, Aristotle seems
to me to have made a very shrewd distinction between in
continence and intemperance, (Ethic. Lib. vii. cap. iii.)
Where incontinence (axgaff/a) reigns, he says, that through