Testimonia

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326 INSTITUTES OF THE BOOK II. man inexcusable, and may be not improperly defined — the judgment of conscience distinguishing sufficiently between just and unjust, and by convicting men on their own testi mony, depriving them of all pretext for ignorance. So indul gent is man toward himself, that, wiiile doing evil, he always endeavours as much as he can to suppress the idea of sin. It was this, apparently, which induced Plato (in his Prota goras) to suppose that sins were committed only through ignorance. There might be some ground for this, if hypocrisy were so successful in hiding vice as to keep the conscience clear in the sight of God. But since the sinner, when trying to evade the judgment of good and evil implanted in him, is ever and anon dragged forward, and not permitted to wink so effectually as not to be compelled at times, whether he will or not, to open his eyes, it is false to say that he sins only through ignorance. 23. Themistius is more accurate in teaching, (Paraphr. in Lib. iii. de Anima, cap. xlvi.,) that the intellect is very sel dom mistaken in the general definition or essence of the matter ; but that deception begins as it advances farther, namely, when it descends to particulars. That homicide, putting the case in the abstract, is an evil, no man will deny; and yet one who is conspiring the death of his enemy deliberates on it as if the thing was good. The adulterer wrill condemn adultery in the abstract, and yet flatter himself while privately committing it. The ignorance lies here : that man, when he comes to the particular, forgets the rule which he had laid down in the general case. Augustine treats most admirably on this subject in his exposition of the first verse of the fifty-seventh Psalm. The doctrine of Themistius, however, does not always hold true : for the turpitude of the crime sometimes presses so on the conscience, that the sinner does not impose upon himself by a false semblance of good, but rushes into sin knowingly and willingly. Hence the expression, — I see the better course, and approve it : I follow the worse, (Medea of Ovid.) For this reason, Aristotle seems to me to have made a very shrewd distinction between in continence and intemperance, (Ethic. Lib. vii. cap. iii.) Where incontinence (axgaff/a) reigns, he says, that through

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