192 INSTITUTES OF THE [bOOK 1
nothing happen fortuitously or contingently ? I answer, that
It was truly observed by Basil the Great, that fortune and
chance are words of the heathen, with the signification of
which the minds of the pious ought not to be occupied. Foi
if all success be the benediction of God, and calamity and
adt'^ersity his malediction, there is no room left in human
affairs for fortmie or chance. And we should attend to this
declaration of Augustine : " I am not pleased with myself,"
says he, " for having, in my treatises against the Academics,
so frequently mentioned fortune^ although I have not intended
by that word any goddess, but a fortuitous occurrence of ex-
ternal things, either good or evil. Hence also such words,
the use of which no religion prohibits, as perhaps, perchance,
peradventure, which, nevertheless, must be entirely referred to
the Divine providence. And on this I have not been silent,
remarking that perhaps what is commonly termed fortune is
regulated by a secret order, and that what we call chance is
only that, with the reason and cause of which we are not ac-
quainted. Thus, indeed, I have expressed myself; but I repent
of having mentioned fortune in this manner, since T see that
men are habituated to a very sinful custom : when they ought
to say,
' This was the will of God,' they say, ' This was the
will of Fortune.' " Finally, he every where maintains, that
if any thmg be left to fortune, the world revolves at random.
And though he elsewhere decides, that all things are conducted
partly by the free will of man, partly by the providence of
God, yet he just after shows that men are subject to it and
governed by it, assumii.g as a principle that nothing could be
more absurd, than for any thing to happen independently of the
ordination of God ; because it would happen at random. By
this reasoning he excludes also any contingence dependent on
the human will ; and immediately after more expressly asserts
that we ought not to inquire for any cause of the will of God.
But in what sense permission otight to be understood, when-
ever it is mentioned by him, will appear from one passage ;
where he proves that the will of God is the supreme and first
cause of all things, because nothing happens but by his com-
mand or permission. He certainly does not suppose God to
remain an idle spectator, determining to permit any thing ;
there is an intervention of actual volition, if I may be allowed
the expression, which otherwise could never be considered as
a cause.
IX. Yet, since the dulness of our minds is very much belnw
the sublimity of the Divine providence, let us endeavour tc
assist them by a distinction. I say, then, that, notwithstanding
the ordination of all things by the certain purpose and direction
of God, yet to us they are fortuitous: not that we S;uppose