Testimonia

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192 INSTITUTES OF THE [bOOK 1 nothing happen fortuitously or contingently ? I answer, that It was truly observed by Basil the Great, that fortune and chance are words of the heathen, with the signification of which the minds of the pious ought not to be occupied. Foi if all success be the benediction of God, and calamity and adt'^ersity his malediction, there is no room left in human affairs for fortmie or chance. And we should attend to this declaration of Augustine : " I am not pleased with myself," says he, " for having, in my treatises against the Academics, so frequently mentioned fortune^ although I have not intended by that word any goddess, but a fortuitous occurrence of ex- ternal things, either good or evil. Hence also such words, the use of which no religion prohibits, as perhaps, perchance, peradventure, which, nevertheless, must be entirely referred to the Divine providence. And on this I have not been silent, remarking that perhaps what is commonly termed fortune is regulated by a secret order, and that what we call chance is only that, with the reason and cause of which we are not ac- quainted. Thus, indeed, I have expressed myself; but I repent of having mentioned fortune in this manner, since T see that men are habituated to a very sinful custom : when they ought to say, ' This was the will of God,' they say, ' This was the will of Fortune.' " Finally, he every where maintains, that if any thmg be left to fortune, the world revolves at random. And though he elsewhere decides, that all things are conducted partly by the free will of man, partly by the providence of God, yet he just after shows that men are subject to it and governed by it, assumii.g as a principle that nothing could be more absurd, than for any thing to happen independently of the ordination of God ; because it would happen at random. By this reasoning he excludes also any contingence dependent on the human will ; and immediately after more expressly asserts that we ought not to inquire for any cause of the will of God. But in what sense permission otight to be understood, when- ever it is mentioned by him, will appear from one passage ; where he proves that the will of God is the supreme and first cause of all things, because nothing happens but by his com- mand or permission. He certainly does not suppose God to remain an idle spectator, determining to permit any thing ; there is an intervention of actual volition, if I may be allowed the expression, which otherwise could never be considered as a cause. IX. Yet, since the dulness of our minds is very much belnw the sublimity of the Divine providence, let us endeavour tc assist them by a distinction. I say, then, that, notwithstanding the ordination of all things by the certain purpose and direction of God, yet to us they are fortuitous: not that we S;uppose

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