ST. ANDREWS UNIVERSITY
From this it does not follow at all that it is not a modification
of his own mind ; what follows is only that it also is a modifica-
tion of another mind. The "independence " of the perception is
thus explained ; but only on the condition that it can never be
known or even surmised to be independent. Its independence
is secured, inasmuch as its existence is not exclusively bound up
with its being a state of this or that mind ; it may exist as a
perception in another mind before and after it becomes a per-
ception in mine. But such independence must remain for ever
unknown and unknowable. For if there is no distinction
between the perception being apprehended by me and its being
my perception, how can I ever come to apprehend that it is or
may be also the perception of a mind other than my own ?
On the whole, it cannot be said that Ferrier has given us a
satisfactory or even a consistent account of the relation of
knowing and being in general, or that he has dealt satisfactorily
with the special problem connected with our knowledge of the
material world in which he was chiefly interested. But if he has
not produced any definite solution of the problems which he
set out to discuss, he has done much to help us to understand the
nature of the questions at issue and the conditions to be fulfilled
in attempting to answer them. He has done this in so fresh
and original a way that his place cannot be supplied by any
other writer. No other philosopher has quite the same kind of
suggestiveness,—a suggestiveness which is by no means exhausted
at the present moment.
G. F. STOUT.
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