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ST. ANDREWS UNIVERSITY From this it does not follow at all that it is not a modification of his own mind ; what follows is only that it also is a modifica- tion of another mind. The "independence " of the perception is thus explained ; but only on the condition that it can never be known or even surmised to be independent. Its independence is secured, inasmuch as its existence is not exclusively bound up with its being a state of this or that mind ; it may exist as a perception in another mind before and after it becomes a per- ception in mine. But such independence must remain for ever unknown and unknowable. For if there is no distinction between the perception being apprehended by me and its being my perception, how can I ever come to apprehend that it is or may be also the perception of a mind other than my own ? On the whole, it cannot be said that Ferrier has given us a satisfactory or even a consistent account of the relation of knowing and being in general, or that he has dealt satisfactorily with the special problem connected with our knowledge of the material world in which he was chiefly interested. But if he has not produced any definite solution of the problems which he set out to discuss, he has done much to help us to understand the nature of the questions at issue and the conditions to be fulfilled in attempting to answer them. He has done this in so fresh and original a way that his place cannot be supplied by any other writer. No other philosopher has quite the same kind of suggestiveness,—a suggestiveness which is by no means exhausted at the present moment. G. F. STOUT. 166

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