8 LETTERS OP ST, AUGUSTINE. [LET, m.
therefore, is to be loved more than the b o d y ; but in what
part of the soul does th is truth resid e? ” “ In the mind and
understanding.” “ W ith w hat has the imderstanding to con
tend ? ” “ W ith the senses.” “ M ust w e then resist the
senses w ith a ll our m ight ? ” “ Certainly.” “ W hat, then, if
th e things w ith which the senses acquaint us give, us plea
sure ?” “ W e m ust prevent them frora doing so.” “ How?”
“ B y acquiring the habit of doing w ithout them , and desiring
better things.” “ B ut i f the soul die, what then ? ” “ W hy,
then truth dies, or intelligence is not truth, or intelligence is
not a part o f the soul, or that which has some part immortal is
liable to d ie : conclusions a ll of w hich I demonstrated long ago
in m y Soliloquies to be absurd because im possible; and I am
firndy persuaded that th is is the case, but somehow through
th e influence of custom in the experience of evils w e are
terrified, and hesitate. - B ut even granting, finally, that the
soul dies, w hich I do n o t' see to be in any w ay possible, i1
remains nevertheless true that a happy life does not consist
in the evanescent jo y which sensible objects can y ie ld : this I
, have pondered deliberately, and proved.”
Perhaps it is on account of reasonings such as these that I
have been judged by my own Nebridius to be, if not absolutely
happy, at least in a sense happy. Let me d so judge m yself to
be h ap p y: for what do I lose thereby, or w hy should I grudge
to think w ell o f m y own estate ? Thus I talked w ith m yself,
then prayed according to m y custom, and fe ll asleep.
5. These things I have thought good to w rite to you. For
it gratifies me that you should thank m e w hen I write freely
to you whatever crosses m y mind ; and to whom can I more
willingly write nonsense^ than to one whom I cannot dis
please ? B ut if it depends upon fortune whether one man love
another or not, look to it, I pray you, how can I be ju stly
called happy when I am so elated w ith joy by fortune’s
favours, and avow edly desire that m y'Store of such good
things may be largely increased 1 For those who are m ost
tru ly w ise, and whom alone it is right to pronounce happy,
have maintained that fortune’s favours ought not to he the
objects o f either fear or desire.
^ Ineptiam.