276 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XI.
to do in this case, as with the sense that is formed, which is
easily discerned from the sensible body without, and again the
will from both, on account of the difference of nature which
is mutually in all three, and of which we have treated suffi-
ciently above. Tor although this trinity, of which we at pre-
sent speak, is introduced into the mind from without; yet
it is transacted within, and there is no part of it without the
nature of the mind itself. In what way, then, can it be de-
monstrated that the will is neither the quasi-parent, nor the
quasi-offspring, either of the corporeal likeness which is con-
tained in the memory, or of that which is copied thence in
recollecting ; when it so unites both in the act of thinking, as
that they appear singly as one, and cannot be discerned except
by reason ? It is then first to be considered that there cannot
be any will to remember, unless we retain in the recesses of
the memory either the whole, or some part, of that thing
which we wish to remember. For the very will to remember
cannot arise in the case of a thing which we have forgotten
altogether and absolutely; since we have already remembered
that the thing which we wish to remember is, or has been, in
our memory. For example, if I wish to remember what I
supped on yesterday, either I have already remembered that I
did sup, or if not yet this, at least I have remembered some-
thing about that time itself, if nothing else ; at all events, I
have remembered yesterday, and that part of yesterday in
which people usually sup, and what supping is. For if I had
not remembered anything at all of this kind, I could not wish
to remember what I supped on yesterday. Whence we may
perceive that the will of remembering proceeds, indeed, from
those things which are retained in the memory, with the addi-
tion also of those which, by the act of discerning, are copied
thence through recollection ; that is, from the combination of
something which we have remembered, and of the vision which
was thence wrought, when w^e remembered, in the mind's eye
of him who thinks. But the will itself which unites both
requires also some other thing, which is, as it were, close at
hand, and adjacent to him who remembers. There are, then,
as many trinities of this kind as there are remembrances ; be-
cause there is no one of them wherein there are not these three