Testimonia

Publiek archief van verzamelde en verwerkte bronrecords.
Overzicht / tekstblob

Tekstblob

sha256: b1b3440a761f7003ea847df4d71b6e5ba6a23fb0054f089c614062a4c94fba76 · 2,404 tekens

276 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XI. to do in this case, as with the sense that is formed, which is easily discerned from the sensible body without, and again the will from both, on account of the difference of nature which is mutually in all three, and of which we have treated suffi- ciently above. Tor although this trinity, of which we at pre- sent speak, is introduced into the mind from without; yet it is transacted within, and there is no part of it without the nature of the mind itself. In what way, then, can it be de- monstrated that the will is neither the quasi-parent, nor the quasi-offspring, either of the corporeal likeness which is con- tained in the memory, or of that which is copied thence in recollecting ; when it so unites both in the act of thinking, as that they appear singly as one, and cannot be discerned except by reason ? It is then first to be considered that there cannot be any will to remember, unless we retain in the recesses of the memory either the whole, or some part, of that thing which we wish to remember. For the very will to remember cannot arise in the case of a thing which we have forgotten altogether and absolutely; since we have already remembered that the thing which we wish to remember is, or has been, in our memory. For example, if I wish to remember what I supped on yesterday, either I have already remembered that I did sup, or if not yet this, at least I have remembered some- thing about that time itself, if nothing else ; at all events, I have remembered yesterday, and that part of yesterday in which people usually sup, and what supping is. For if I had not remembered anything at all of this kind, I could not wish to remember what I supped on yesterday. Whence we may perceive that the will of remembering proceeds, indeed, from those things which are retained in the memory, with the addi- tion also of those which, by the act of discerning, are copied thence through recollection ; that is, from the combination of something which we have remembered, and of the vision which was thence wrought, when w^e remembered, in the mind's eye of him who thinks. But the will itself which unites both requires also some other thing, which is, as it were, close at hand, and adjacent to him who remembers. There are, then, as many trinities of this kind as there are remembrances ; be- cause there is no one of them wherein there are not these three

Alle records · Zoek op deze hash