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Technische verwerking bevestigt geen inhoudelijke beoordeling of toestemming voor openbare publicatie.

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ST. ANDREWS UNIVERSITY Ferrier's philosophy. What he expressly asserts is that, together with whatever else is known, the knowing self must be known, and this is part of what he means. But it is not the whole or the most essential part. It becomes abundantly clear in the sequel that for Ferrier the really important question is this : when subject and object are apprehended together, what relation is apprehended as subsisting between them? Granting that they must always be known conjointly, it by no means follows that they are known as incapable of existing separately. For it would still be true that, in knowing or even in thinking of them as separate or separable, we should be bound to think of them together. I must think at once both of A and B, whether I think ofthem as being mutually dependent or as mutually independent, or ofA as dependent on B but not B on A, or B as dependent on A but not A on B. In the case we are con- sidering, it may be taken as self-evident that knowing or thinking can have no being apart from something known or thought of. But the inverse proposition, that what is known or thought of can have no being apart from the knowing or thinking, is by no means so obvious. Yet this is what Ferrier really requires his readers to grant. If this is not what is intended in the first proposition of the Institutes, all the important applications of it, the pretended deductions from it, become nugatory. Only on this basis can it be shown, as he attempts to show, that knowledge of matter per se is impossible, that the current distinction between primary and secondary qualities is indefensible, or that the ego cannot be known to be material. Hence these theses are not so much inferences from the original proposition as further determinations of what it is really intended to mean. Further, when it is understood in this fully developed and amended sense, it ceases to command assent so readily as in its original form. The reader may be prepared to admit that in all his knowing he has some awareness of himself, however vague, 160

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