ST. ANDREWS UNIVERSITY
Ferrier's philosophy. What he expressly asserts is that, together
with whatever else is known, the knowing self must be known,
and this is part of what he means. But it is not the whole or
the most essential part. It becomes abundantly clear in the
sequel that for Ferrier the really important question is this : when
subject and object are apprehended together, what relation is
apprehended as subsisting between them? Granting that they
must always be known conjointly, it by no means follows that
they are known as incapable of existing separately. For it
would still be true that, in knowing or even in thinking of them
as separate or separable, we should be bound to think of them
together. I must think at once both of A and B, whether
I think ofthem as being mutually dependent or as mutually
independent, or ofA as dependent on B but not B on A, or B as
dependent on A but not A on B. In the case we are con-
sidering, it may be taken as self-evident that knowing or thinking
can have no being apart from something known or thought of.
But the inverse proposition, that what is known or thought of
can have no being apart from the knowing or thinking, is by no
means so obvious. Yet this is what Ferrier really requires his
readers to grant. If this is not what is intended in the first
proposition of the Institutes, all the important applications of it,
the pretended deductions from it, become nugatory. Only on
this basis can it be shown, as he attempts to show, that knowledge
of matter per se is impossible, that the current distinction
between primary and secondary qualities is indefensible, or
that the ego cannot be known to be material. Hence these
theses are not so much inferences from the original proposition
as further determinations of what it is really intended to mean.
Further, when it is understood in this fully developed and
amended sense, it ceases to command assent so readily as in its
original form. The reader may be prepared to admit that in all
his knowing he has some awareness of himself, however vague,
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