venture to suppose the existence of the Only-begotten Son to be, like the creation, from any
beginning comprehensible by us, he must certainly append to his statement concerning the
Son the rest also of the sequence895; for it is not possible to avoid acknowledging, together
with the beginning, that also which follows from it. For just as if one were to admit some
person to be a man in all896 the properties of his nature, he would observe that in this con-
fession he declared him to be an animal and rational, and whatever else is conceived of man,
so by the same reasoning, if we should understand any of the properties of creation to be
present in the Divine essence, it will no longer be open to us to refrain from attaching to
that pure Nature the rest of the list of the attributes contemplated therein. For the “beginning”
will demand by force and compulsion that which follows it; for the “beginning,” thus con-
ceived, is a beginning of what comes after it, in such a sense, that if they are, it is, and if the
things connected with it are removed, the antecedent also would not remain897. Now as the
book of Wisdom speaks of “midst” and “end” as well as of “beginning,” if we assume in the
Nature of the Only-begotten, according to the heretical dogma, some beginning of existence
defined by a certain mark of time, the book of Wisdom will by no means allow us to refrain
from subjoining to the “beginning” a “midst” and an “end” also. If this should be done we
shall find, as the result of our arguments, that the Divine word shows us that the Deity is
mortal. For if, according to the book of Wisdom, the “end” is a necessary consequence of
the “beginning,” and the idea of “midst” is involved in that of extremes, he who allows one
of these also potentially maintains the others, and lays down bounds of measure and limit-
ation for the infinite Nature. And if this is impious and absurd, the giving a beginning to
that argument which ends in impiety deserves equal, or even greater censure; and the begin-
ning of this absurd doctrine was seen to be the supposition that the life of the Son was cir-
cumscribed by some beginning. Thus one of two courses is before them: either they must
revert to sound doctrine under the compulsion of the foregoing arguments, and contemplate
Him Who is of the Father in union with the Father’s eternity, or if they do not like this, they
must limit the eternity of the Son in both ways, and reduce the limitless character of His life
to non-existence by a beginning and an end. And, granted that the nature both of souls and
of the angels has no end, and is no way hindered from going on to eternity, by the fact of
895 That is, he must also acknowledge a “middle” and an “end” of the existence which has a “beginning.”
896 Oehler’s emendation, for which he gives weighty ms. authority, is certainly an improvement on the
earlier text, but in sense it is a little unsatisfactory. The argument seems to require the hypothesis not of some
one acknowledging a person to be a man in all, but in some attributes. The defect, however, may possibly be in
S. Gregory’s argument, not in the text.
897 i.e.“if the ‘middle’ and ‘end’ are not admitted, at the ‘beginning,’ which is the ‘beginning’ of a sequence,
is thereby implicitly denied.” Oehler’s punctuation has been somewhat altered here, and at several points in the
remainder of the book, where it appears to require emendation.
402
Then, after showing that the Person of the Only-begotten and Maker of things…