Testimonia

Publiek archief van verzamelde en verwerkte bronrecords.
Overzicht / tekstblob

Tekstblob

sha256: f8b3be4a62ffc46869d79b93b649f063acceef0f76840ebbc868d292223ef6a1 · 3,511 tekens

venture to suppose the existence of the Only-begotten Son to be, like the creation, from any beginning comprehensible by us, he must certainly append to his statement concerning the Son the rest also of the sequence895; for it is not possible to avoid acknowledging, together with the beginning, that also which follows from it. For just as if one were to admit some person to be a man in all896 the properties of his nature, he would observe that in this con- fession he declared him to be an animal and rational, and whatever else is conceived of man, so by the same reasoning, if we should understand any of the properties of creation to be present in the Divine essence, it will no longer be open to us to refrain from attaching to that pure Nature the rest of the list of the attributes contemplated therein. For the “beginning” will demand by force and compulsion that which follows it; for the “beginning,” thus con- ceived, is a beginning of what comes after it, in such a sense, that if they are, it is, and if the things connected with it are removed, the antecedent also would not remain897. Now as the book of Wisdom speaks of “midst” and “end” as well as of “beginning,” if we assume in the Nature of the Only-begotten, according to the heretical dogma, some beginning of existence defined by a certain mark of time, the book of Wisdom will by no means allow us to refrain from subjoining to the “beginning” a “midst” and an “end” also. If this should be done we shall find, as the result of our arguments, that the Divine word shows us that the Deity is mortal. For if, according to the book of Wisdom, the “end” is a necessary consequence of the “beginning,” and the idea of “midst” is involved in that of extremes, he who allows one of these also potentially maintains the others, and lays down bounds of measure and limit- ation for the infinite Nature. And if this is impious and absurd, the giving a beginning to that argument which ends in impiety deserves equal, or even greater censure; and the begin- ning of this absurd doctrine was seen to be the supposition that the life of the Son was cir- cumscribed by some beginning. Thus one of two courses is before them: either they must revert to sound doctrine under the compulsion of the foregoing arguments, and contemplate Him Who is of the Father in union with the Father’s eternity, or if they do not like this, they must limit the eternity of the Son in both ways, and reduce the limitless character of His life to non-existence by a beginning and an end. And, granted that the nature both of souls and of the angels has no end, and is no way hindered from going on to eternity, by the fact of 895 That is, he must also acknowledge a “middle” and an “end” of the existence which has a “beginning.” 896 Oehler’s emendation, for which he gives weighty ms. authority, is certainly an improvement on the earlier text, but in sense it is a little unsatisfactory. The argument seems to require the hypothesis not of some one acknowledging a person to be a man in all, but in some attributes. The defect, however, may possibly be in S. Gregory’s argument, not in the text. 897 i.e.“if the ‘middle’ and ‘end’ are not admitted, at the ‘beginning,’ which is the ‘beginning’ of a sequence, is thereby implicitly denied.” Oehler’s punctuation has been somewhat altered here, and at several points in the remainder of the book, where it appears to require emendation. 402 Then, after showing that the Person of the Only-begotten and Maker of things…

Alle records · Zoek op deze hash