{"author":null,"canonical_references":[],"date_end":null,"date_start":null,"deduplication_fingerprint":"8d7cdb9f4f1c7012d9a94ceabf299bafb3a9e12a27bd6a053845791bc81b1868","edition_title":"The City of God, Volume I","edition_translators":["Marcus Dods","George Wilson (Book IV)","J. J. Smith (Books V-VIII)"],"edition_year":1871,"explicit_reference_candidates":[],"headings":["THE WORKS OF AURELIUS AUGUSTINE,","BOOK EIGHTH.","ARGUMENT."],"id":"pg45304-paragraph-575","license_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/policy/license.html","note_targets":[],"public_import_allowed":false,"record_kind":"original-paragraph-unclassified","review_required":["work and recension attribution","original-work chronology","Bible reference numbering and citation kind","English edition rights and attribution"],"review_status":"needs_review","rights_evidence":"Provider catalog reports public domain in the USA. Original transcription title leaves state T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1871; printed translator allocation retained. Gutenberg credits Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries without an exact scan identifier. Full provider license preserved with acquired original; republication and per-work metadata remain unreviewed.","source_anchor":null,"source_ebook":45304,"source_html":"<p>The remaining part of philosophy is morals, or what is\r\ncalled by the Greeks ἠθική, in which is discussed the question\r\nconcerning the chief good,—that which will leave us nothing\r\nfurther to seek in order to be blessed, if only we make all\r\nour actions refer to it, and seek it not for the sake of something\r\nelse, but for its own sake. Therefore it is called the\r\nend, because we wish other things on account of it, but itself\r\nonly for its own sake. This beatific good, therefore, according\r\nto some, comes to a man from the body, according to others,\r\nfrom the mind, and, according to others, from both together.\r\nFor they saw that man himself consists of soul and body;\r\nand therefore they believed that from either of these two,\r\nor from both together, their well-being must proceed, consisting\r\nin a certain final good, which could render them blessed,\r\nand to which they might refer all their actions, not requiring\r\nanything ulterior to which to refer that good itself. This is\r\nwhy those who have added a third kind of good things, which\r\nthey call extrinsic,—as honour, glory, wealth, and the like,—have\r\nnot regarded them as part of the final good, that is, to be\r\nsought after for their own sake, but as things which are to be\r\nsought for the sake of something else, affirming that this kind\r\nof good is good to the good, and evil to the evil. Wherefore,\r\nwhether they have sought the good of man from the\r\nmind or from the body, or from both together, it is still only\r\nfrom man they have supposed that it must be sought. But\r\nthey who have sought it from the body have sought it from\r\nthe inferior part of man; they who have sought it from the\r\nmind, from the superior part; and they who have sought it\r\nfrom both, from the whole man. Whether, therefore, they<span class=\"pagenum\"><a id=\"Page_318\">[Pg 318]</a></span>\r\nhave sought it from any part, or from the whole man, still\r\nthey have only sought it from man; nor have these differences,\r\nbeing three, given rise only to three dissentient sects\r\nof philosophers, but to many. For diverse philosophers have\r\nheld diverse opinions, both concerning the good of the body,\r\nand the good of the mind, and the good of both together.\r\nLet, therefore, all these give place to those philosophers who\r\nhave not affirmed that a man is blessed by the enjoyment of\r\nthe body, or by the enjoyment of the mind, but by the enjoyment\r\nof God,—enjoying Him, however, not as the mind does\r\nthe body or itself, or as one friend enjoys another, but as the\r\neye enjoys light, if, indeed, we may draw any comparison\r\nbetween these things. But what the nature of this comparison\r\nis, will, if God help me, be shown in another place, to the\r\nbest of my ability. At present, it is sufficient to mention\r\nthat Plato determined the final good to be to live according\r\nto virtue, and affirmed that he only can attain to virtue who\r\nknows and imitates God,—which knowledge and imitation are\r\nthe only cause of blessedness. Therefore he did not doubt\r\nthat to philosophize is to love God, whose nature is incorporeal.\r\nWhence it certainly follows that the student of\r\nwisdom, that is, the philosopher, will then become blessed\r\nwhen he shall have begun to enjoy God. For though he is\r\nnot necessarily blessed who enjoys that which he loves (for\r\nmany are miserable by loving that which ought not to be\r\nloved, and still more miserable when they enjoy it), nevertheless\r\nno one is blessed who does not enjoy that which he loves.\r\nFor even they who love things which ought not to be loved\r\ndo not count themselves blessed by loving merely, but by\r\nenjoying them. Who, then, but the most miserable will deny\r\nthat he is blessed, who enjoys that which he loves, and loves\r\nthe true and highest good? But the true and highest good,\r\naccording to Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him\r\na philosopher who loves God; for philosophy is directed to the\r\nobtaining of the blessed life, and he who loves God is blessed\r\nin the enjoyment of God.</p>","source_sha256":"d89e9a2b80bb59f394f0fb1bf313b39fab162f06af6642166d62c5912c1195f1","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/45304/pg45304-images.html","text_sha256":"281e0a139c4df07e8115240cb1bdcf3ced2c9adf87c358fb9d1e41ac157540f1","verified":false,"work_id":null}