{"author":null,"canonical_references":[],"date_end":null,"date_start":null,"deduplication_fingerprint":"bc5023e098f217020963cd83e269c5edecf9eebee2416e4586bd5585889970b4","edition_title":"The City of God, Volume I","edition_translators":["Marcus Dods","George Wilson (Book IV)","J. J. Smith (Books V-VIII)"],"edition_year":1871,"explicit_reference_candidates":[],"headings":["THE WORKS OF AURELIUS AUGUSTINE,","BOOK FIFTH.","ARGUMENT."],"id":"pg45304-paragraph-368","license_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/policy/license.html","note_targets":[],"public_import_allowed":false,"record_kind":"original-paragraph-unclassified","review_required":["work and recension attribution","original-work chronology","Bible reference numbering and citation kind","English edition rights and attribution"],"review_status":"needs_review","rights_evidence":"Provider catalog reports public domain in the USA. Original transcription title leaves state T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1871; printed translator allocation retained. Gutenberg credits Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries without an exact scan identifier. Full provider license preserved with acquired original; republication and per-work metadata remain unreviewed.","source_anchor":null,"source_ebook":45304,"source_html":"<p>But, let these perplexing debatings and disputations of the<span class=\"pagenum\"><a id=\"Page_191\">[Pg 191]</a></span>\r\nphilosophers go on as they may, we, in order that we may\r\nconfess the most high and true God Himself, do confess His\r\nwill, supreme power, and prescience. Neither let us be afraid\r\nlest, after all, we do not do by will that which we do by will,\r\nbecause He, whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew that\r\nwe would do it. It was this which Cicero was afraid of, and\r\ntherefore opposed foreknowledge. The Stoics also maintained\r\nthat all things do not come to pass by necessity, although\r\nthey contended that all things happen according to destiny.\r\nWhat is it, then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future\r\nthings? Doubtless it was this,—that if all future things\r\nhave been foreknown, they will happen in the order in which\r\nthey have been foreknown; and if they come to pass in this\r\norder, there is a certain order of things foreknown by God;\r\nand if a certain order of things, then a certain order of causes,\r\nfor nothing can happen which is not preceded by some efficient\r\ncause. But if there is a certain order of causes according to\r\nwhich everything happens which does happen, then by fate,\r\nsays he, all things happen which do happen. But if this be\r\nso, then is there nothing in our own power, and there is no\r\nsuch thing as freedom of will; and if we grant that, says he,\r\nthe whole economy of human life is subverted. In vain are\r\nlaws enacted. In vain are reproaches, praises, chidings, exhortations\r\nhad recourse to; and there is no justice whatever\r\nin the appointment of rewards for the good, and punishments\r\nfor the wicked. And that consequences so disgraceful, and\r\nabsurd, and pernicious to humanity may not follow, Cicero\r\nchooses to reject the foreknowledge of future things, and shuts\r\nup the religious mind to this alternative, to make choice between\r\ntwo things, either that something is in our own power,\r\nor that there is foreknowledge,—both of which cannot be true;\r\nbut if the one is affirmed, the other is thereby denied. He\r\ntherefore, like a truly great and wise man, and one who consulted\r\nvery much and very skilfully for the good of humanity,\r\nof those two chose the freedom of the will, to confirm which\r\nhe denied the foreknowledge of future things; and thus, wishing\r\nto make men free, he makes them sacrilegious. But the\r\nreligious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains\r\nboth by the faith of piety. But how so? says Cicero; for the<span class=\"pagenum\"><a id=\"Page_192\">[Pg 192]</a></span>\r\nknowledge of future things being granted, there follows a chain\r\nof consequences which ends in this, that there can be nothing\r\ndepending on our own free wills. And further, if there is\r\nanything depending on our wills, we must go backwards by\r\nthe same steps of reasoning till we arrive at the conclusion\r\nthat there is no foreknowledge of future things. For we go\r\nbackwards through all the steps in the following order:—If\r\nthere is free will, all things do not happen according to\r\nfate; if all things do not happen according to fate, there is\r\nnot a certain order of causes; and if there is not a certain\r\norder of causes, neither is there a certain order of things foreknown\r\nby God,—for things cannot come to pass except they\r\nare preceded by efficient causes,—but, if there is no fixed and\r\ncertain order of causes foreknown by God, all things cannot\r\nbe said to happen according as He foreknew that they would\r\nhappen. And further, if it is not true that all things happen\r\njust as they have been foreknown by Him, there is not, says\r\nhe, in God any foreknowledge of future events.</p>","source_sha256":"d89e9a2b80bb59f394f0fb1bf313b39fab162f06af6642166d62c5912c1195f1","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/45304/pg45304-images.html","text_sha256":"559bb123c877ae9af1c4c00788060ea5fc6cf0ab8baccec55465c8d221d80a81","verified":false,"work_id":null}