{"author":null,"backreferences":[{"context_html":"<p>Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of\r\nreason, we assert both that God knows all things before\r\nthey come to pass, and that we do by our free will whatsoever\r\nwe know and feel to be done by us only because\r\nwe will it. But that all things come to pass by fate, we\r\ndo not say; nay we affirm that nothing comes to pass by\r\nfate; for we demonstrate that the name of fate, as it is wont\r\nto be used by those who speak of fate, meaning thereby the\r\nposition of the stars at the time of each one's conception\r\nor birth, is an unmeaning word, for astrology itself is a delusion.\r\nBut an order of causes in which the highest efficiency\r\nis attributed to the will of God, we neither deny nor do we\r\ndesignate it by the name of fate, unless, perhaps, we may\r\nunderstand fate to mean that which is spoken, deriving it from\r\n<i>fari</i>, to speak; for we cannot deny that it is written in the\r\nsacred Scriptures, \"God hath spoken once; these two things\r\nhave I heard, that power belongeth unto God. Also unto\r\nThee, O God, belongeth mercy: for Thou wilt render unto\r\nevery man according to his works.\"<a id=\"FNanchor_192_192\"></a><a class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_192_192\">[192]</a> Now the expression,\r\n\"Once hath He spoken,\" is to be understood as meaning \"<i>immovably</i>,<span class=\"pagenum\"><a id=\"Page_193\">[Pg 193]</a></span>\"\r\nthat is, unchangeably hath He spoken, inasmuch as\r\nHe knows unchangeably all things which shall be, and all\r\nthings which He will do. We might, then, use the word fate\r\nin the sense it bears when derived from <i>fari</i>, to speak, had it\r\nnot already come to be understood in another sense, into which\r\nI am unwilling that the hearts of men should unconsciously\r\nslide. But it does not follow that, though there is for God a\r\ncertain order of all causes, there must therefore be nothing\r\ndepending on the free exercise of our own wills, for our wills\r\nthemselves are included in that order of causes which is certain\r\nto God, and is embraced by His foreknowledge, for human\r\nwills are also causes of human actions; and He who foreknew\r\nall the causes of things would certainly among those causes\r\nnot have been ignorant of our wills. For even that very concession\r\nwhich Cicero himself makes is enough to refute him\r\nin this argument. For what does it help him to say that\r\nnothing takes place without a cause, but that every cause is\r\nnot fatal, there being a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and\r\na voluntary cause? It is sufficient that he confesses that\r\nwhatever happens must be preceded by a cause. For we say\r\nthat those causes which are called fortuitous are not a mere\r\nname for the absence of causes, but are only latent, and we\r\nattribute them either to the will of the true God, or to that of\r\nspirits of some kind or other. And as to natural causes, we by\r\nno means separate them from the will of Him who is the author\r\nand framer of all nature. But now as to voluntary causes.\r\nThey are referable either to God, or to angels, or to men, or to\r\nanimals of whatever description, if indeed those instinctive\r\nmovements of animals devoid of reason, by which, in accordance\r\nwith their own nature, they seek or shun various things,\r\nare to be called wills. And when I speak of the wills of\r\nangels, I mean either the wills of good angels, whom we call\r\nthe angels of God, or of the wicked angels, whom we call the\r\nangels of the devil, or demons. Also by the wills of men I\r\nmean the wills either of the good or of the wicked. And from\r\nthis we conclude that there are no efficient causes of all things\r\nwhich come to pass unless voluntary causes, that is, such as\r\nbelong to that nature which is the spirit of life. For the air\r\nor wind is called spirit, but, inasmuch as it is a body, it is not<span class=\"pagenum\"><a id=\"Page_194\">[Pg 194]</a></span>\r\nthe spirit of life. The spirit of life, therefore, which quickens\r\nall things, and is the creator of every body, and of every\r\ncreated spirit, is God Himself, the uncreated spirit. In His\r\nsupreme will resides the power which acts on the wills of all\r\ncreated spirits, helping the good, judging the evil, controlling\r\nall, granting power to some, not granting it to others. For,\r\nas He is the creator of all natures, so also is He the bestower\r\nof all powers, not of all wills; for wicked wills are not from\r\nHim, being contrary to nature, which is from Him. As to\r\nbodies, they are more subject to wills: some to our wills, by\r\nwhich I mean the wills of all living mortal creatures, but\r\nmore to the wills of men than of beasts. But all of them are\r\nmost of all subject to the will of God, to whom all wills also\r\nare subject, since they have no power except what He has\r\nbestowed upon them. The cause of things, therefore, which\r\nmakes but is not made, is God; but all other causes both\r\nmake and are made. Such are all created spirits, and especially\r\nthe rational. Material causes, therefore, which may rather\r\nbe said to be made than to make, are not to be reckoned\r\namong efficient causes, because they can only do what the\r\nwills of spirits do by them. How, then, does an order of\r\ncauses which is certain to the foreknowledge of God necessitate\r\nthat there should be nothing which is dependent on our wills,\r\nwhen our wills themselves have a very important place in the\r\norder of causes? Cicero, then, contends with those who call\r\nthis order of causes fatal, or rather designate this order itself\r\nby the name of fate; to which we have an abhorrence, especially\r\non account of the word, which men have become accustomed\r\nto understand as meaning what is not true. But,\r\nwhereas he denies that the order of all causes is most certain,\r\nand perfectly clear to the prescience of God, we detest his\r\nopinion more than the Stoics do. For he either denies that\r\nGod exists,—which, indeed, in an assumed personage, he has\r\nlaboured to do, in his book <i>De Natura Deorum</i>,—or if he\r\nconfesses that He exists, but denies that He is prescient of\r\nfuture things, what is that but just \"the fool saying in his\r\nheart there is no God?\" For one who is not prescient of all\r\nfuture things is not God. Wherefore our wills also have just\r\nso much power as God willed and foreknew that they should<span class=\"pagenum\"><a id=\"Page_195\">[Pg 195]</a></span>\r\nhave; and therefore whatever power they have, they have it\r\nwithin most certain limits; and whatever they are to do, they\r\nare most assuredly to do, for He whose foreknowledge is infallible\r\nforeknew that they would have the power to do it,\r\nand would do it. Wherefore, if I should choose to apply the\r\nname of fate to anything at all, I should rather say that fate\r\nbelongs to the weaker of two parties, will to the stronger, who\r\nhas the other in his power, than that the freedom of our will\r\nis excluded by that order of causes, which, by an unusual\r\napplication of the word peculiar to themselves, the Stoics call\r\n<i>Fate</i>.</p>","headings":["THE WORKS OF AURELIUS AUGUSTINE,","BOOK FIFTH.","ARGUMENT."],"marker_anchor":null,"paragraph_id":"pg45304-paragraph-369"}],"canonical_references":[],"date_end":null,"date_start":null,"deduplication_fingerprint":"c6176764560eff51cb51917b96d339ccbbe381d0a99d8abb277503dccaf5fc0b","edition_title":"The City of God, Volume I","edition_translators":["Marcus Dods","George Wilson (Book IV)","J. J. Smith (Books V-VIII)"],"edition_year":1871,"explicit_reference_candidates":[{"book":"PSA","chapter":62,"kind":"unreviewed","source_notation":"Ps. lxii. 11","verse":11,"verse_end":11}],"headings":[],"id":"pg45304-Footnote_192_192","license_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/policy/license.html","public_import_allowed":false,"record_kind":"original-editor-translator-note","review_required":["work and recension attribution","original-work chronology","Bible reference numbering and citation kind","English edition rights and attribution"],"review_status":"needs_review","rights_evidence":"Provider catalog reports public domain in the USA. Original transcription title leaves state T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1871; printed translator allocation retained. Gutenberg credits Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries without an exact scan identifier. Full provider license preserved with acquired original; republication and per-work metadata remain unreviewed.","source_anchor":"Footnote_192_192","source_ebook":45304,"source_html":"<div class=\"footnote\">\n<p><a id=\"Footnote_192_192\"></a><a class=\"pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_192_192\"><span class=\"label\">[192]</span></a> Ps. lxii. 11, 12.</p></div>","source_sha256":"d89e9a2b80bb59f394f0fb1bf313b39fab162f06af6642166d62c5912c1195f1","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/45304/pg45304-images.html#Footnote_192_192","text_sha256":"f9b803c412b29680de554476268a7b4867e2ecc30054354e0257dc0bbd980218","verified":false,"work_id":null}