II. But nevertheless much had
happened in the interval of 130 years that divides them and this leads
us to consider the limits which the state of the Church, as well as
Gregory’s own originality and more extended physical knowledge,
placed upon the complete filling in of the outlines sketched by the
master. First and chiefly, Origen’s doctrine of the pre-existence
of the soul could not be retained; and we know that Gregory not only
abandoned it, but attacked it with all his powers of logic in his
treatise, De Animâ et Resurrectione: for which he receives
the applause of the Emperor Justinian. Souls, according to Origen, had
pre-existed from eternity: they were created certainly, but there never
was a time when they did not exist: so that the procession even of the
Holy Spirit could in thought only be prior to their existence. Then a
failure of their free wills to grasp the true good, and a consequent
cooling of the fire of love within them, plunged them in this material
bodily existence, which their own sin made a suffering one. This view
had certainly great merits: it absolved the Deity from being the author
of evil, and so was a ‘théodicée;’ it entirely
got rid of the two rival principles, good and evil, of the Gnostics;
and it avoided the seeming incongruity of what was to last for ever in
the future being not eternal in the past. Why then was it rejected? Not
only because of the objection urged by Methodius, that the addition of
a body would be no remedy but rather an increase of the sin; or that
urged amongst many others by Gregory, that a vice cannot be regarded as
the precursor of the birth of each human soul into this or into other
worlds; but more than that and chiefly, because such a doctrine
contravened the more distinct views now growing up as to what the
Christian creation was, and the more careful definitions also of the
Trinity now embodied in the creeds. In fact the pre-existence of the
soul was wrapped up in a cosmogony that could no longer approve itself
to the Christian consciousness. In asserting the freedom of the will,
and placing in the will the cause of evil, Origen had so far banished
emanationism; but in his view of the eternity of the world, and in that
of the eternal pre-existence of souls which accompanied it, he had not
altogether stamped it out. He connects rational natures so closely with
the Deity that each individual λόγος seems
almost, in a Platonic way, to lie in the Divine which c.
Cels. VI. 64. he
styles οὐσία
οὐσιῶν, ἰδέα
ἰδεῶν. They are
‘partial brightnesses (ἀπαυγάσμαπα) of the glory of God.’ He In
Joann., tom. 32, 18. allows
them, of course, to have been created in the Scriptural sense of that
word, which is certainly an advance upon Justin; but his creation is
not that distinct event in time which Christianity requires and the
exacter treatment of the nature of the Divine Persons had now
developed. His creation, both the intelligible and visible world,
receives from him an eternity which is unnatural and incongruous in
relation to his other speculations and beliefs: it lingers,
Tithonus-like, in the presence of the Divine Persons, without any
meaning and purpose for its life; it is the last relic of Paganism, as
it were, in a system which is otherwise Christian to the very core. His
strenuous effort to banish all ideas of time, at all events from the
intelligible world, ended in this eternal creation of that world; which
seemed to join the eternally generated Son too closely to it, and gave
occasion to the Arians to say that He too was a κτίσμα. This eternal pre-existence in fact almost destroyed the idea of
creation, and made the Deity in a way dependent on His own world.
Athanasius, therefore, and his followers were roused to separate the
divinity of the Son from everything created. The relation of the world
to God could no longer be explained in the same terms as those which
they employed to illustrate the relations between the Divine Persons;
and when once the doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Father and
Son had been accepted and firmly established there could be no more
favour shown by the defenders of that doctrine to the merely Platonic
view of the nature and origin of souls and of matter.