The author of the Essays seems to suppose such a necessity to take place, as is inconsistent
with some supposable power of arbitrary choice, 165 or that there is some liberty conceivable,
whereby men’s own actions might be more properly in their power, 166 and by which events
might be more dependent on ourselves: 167 contrary to what I suppose to be evident in my
Inquiry. What way can be imagined, of our actions being more in our power, from ourselves,
or dependent on ourselves, than their being from our power to fulfil our own choice, to act
from our own inclination, pursue our own views, and execute our own designs? Certainly,
to be able to act thus, is as properly having our actions in our power, and dependent on
ourselves, as a being liable to be the subject of acts and events contingently and fortuitously,
without desire, view, purpose, or design, or any principle of action within ourselves; as we
must be, according to this author’s own declared sense, if our actions are performed with
that liberty that is opposed, to moral necessity.
This author seems every where to suppose, that necessity, most properly so called, attends
all men’s actions; and that the terms, necessary, unavoidable, impossible, &c. are equally
applicable to the case of moral and natural necessity. In p. 173. he says, The idea of necessary
and unavoidable equally agrees, both to moral and physical necessity. And in p. 184. All
things that fall out in the natural and moral world are, alike necessary. P. 174. This inclination
and choice is unavoidable, caused or occasioned by the prevailing motive. In this lies the
necessity of our actions, that, in such circumstances, it was impossible we could act otherwise.
He often expresses himself in like manner elsewhere, speaking in strong terms of men’s ac-
tions as unavoidable, what they cannot forbear, having no power over their own actions,
the order of them being unalterably fixed, and inseparably linked together, &c. 168
On the contrary, I have largely declared, that the connexion between antecedent things
and consequent ones, which takes place with regard to the acts of men’s Wills, which is
called moral necessity, is called by the name of Necessity improperly; and that all such terms
as must, cannot, impossible, unable, irresistible, unavoidable, invincible, &c. when applied
here, are not applied in their proper signification, and are either used nonsensically, and
with perfect insignificance, or in a sense quite diverse from their original and proper
meaning, and their use in common speech: and, that such a necessity as attends the acts of
men’s Will, is more properly called certainty, than necessity; it being no other than the certain
connexion between the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms their existence.
Agreeably to what is observed in my Inquiry, I think it is evidently owing to a strong
prejudice, arising from an insensible habitual perversion and misapplication of such like
165 P. 169.
166 P. 191, 195, 197, 206.
167 P. 183.
168 P. 180, 188, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 205, 206.
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SECTION XV. Containing Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality…