Chapter XII.
The answer on the nature of things good, bad, and indifferent.
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To this Abbot Theonas thus began his reply. It is indeed right for us, even when we can
not see the reason, to yield to the authority of the fathers and to a custom of our predecessors
that has been continued through so many years down to our own time, and to observe it,
as handed down from antiquity, with constant care and reverence. But since you want to
know the reasons and grounds for this, receive in few words what we have heard as handed
down by our Elders on this subject. But before we bring forward the authority of Holy
Scripture, we will, if you please, say a little about the nature and character of the fast, that
afterwards the authority of Holy Scripture may support our words. The Divine Wisdom
has pointed out in Ecclesiastes that for everything, i.e., for all things happy or those which
are considered unfortunate and unhappy, there is a right time: saying: “For all things there
is a time, and a time for everything under the heaven. A time to bring forth and a time to
die; a time to plant and a time to pull down what is planted; a time to kill and a time to heal;
a time to destroy and a time to build; a time to weep and a time to laugh; a time to mourn
and a time to dance; a time to cast away stones and a time to gather stones; a time to embrace
and a time to refrain from embracing; a time to get and a time to lose; a time to keep and a
time to send away; a time to scatter and a time to collect; a time to be silent and a time to
speak; a time to love and a time to hate; a time for war and a time for peace;” and below:
“For there is a time,” it says, “for everything and for every deed.”118 None therefore of these
things does it lay down as always good, but only when any of them are fittingly done and
at the right time, so that these very things which at one time, when done at the right moment,
turn out well, if they are ventured on at a wrong or unsuitable time, are found to be useless
or harmful; only excepting those things which are in their own nature good or bad, and
which cannot ever be made the opposite, as, e.g., justice, prudence, fortitude, temperance
and the rest of the virtues, or on the other hand, those faults, the description of which cannot
possibly be altered or fall under the other head. But those things which can sometimes turn
out with either result, so that, in accordance with the character of those who use them, they
are found to be either good or bad, these we consider to be not absolutely in their own
natures useful or injurious, but only so in accordance with the mind of the doer, and the
suitableness of the time.
118 Eccl. iii. 1–8, 17.
Chapter XII. The answer on the nature of things good, bad, and indifferent.
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Chapter XII. The answer on the nature of things good, bad, and indiffer…