“For He Who is most highly
exalted in God Himself This
seems to be the force of the phrase if we are to follow Oehler’s
mss. and read ὁ γὰρ
ἐξοχώτατος
αὐτοῦ θεοῦ. The αὐτὸς θεὸς
of the earlier editions gives a simpler sense. The
phrase as read by Oehler certainly savours more of Philo than of
Eunomius: but it is worth noting that S. Gregory does not dwell upon
this part of the clause as being borrowed from Philo (though he may
intend to include it in the general statement), but upon what follows
it: and from his citation from Philo it would seem that the latter
spoke (not of ὁ ἐξοχώτατος
θεοῦ but) of ὁ Θεὸς πρὸ τῶν
ἄλλων ὅσα
γεννητά. before all other
things that are generated,” he says, “has dominion over His
own power.” The phrase has been transferred by our pamphleteer
word for word from the Hebrew Philo to his own argument, and
Eunomius’ theft will be proved by Philo’s works themselves
to any one who cares about it. I note the fact, however, at present,
not so much to reproach our speech-monger with the poverty of his own
arguments and thoughts, as with the intention of showing to my readers
the close relationship between the doctrine of Eunomius and the
reasoning of the Jews. For this phrase of Philo would not have fitted
word for word into his argument had there not been a sort of kindred
between the intention of the one and the other. In the Hebrew author
you may find the phrase in this form: “God, before all other
things that are generated”; and what follows, “has dominion
over His own power,” is an addition of the new Judaism. But what
an absurdity this involves an examination of the saying will clearly
show. “God,” he says, “has dominion over His own
power.” Tell me, what is He? over what has He dominion? Is He
something else than His own power, and Lord of a power that is
something else than Himself? Then power is overcome by the absence of
power. For that which is something else than power is surely not power,
and thus He is found to have dominion over power just in so far as He
is not power. Or again, God, being power, has another power in Himself,
and has dominion over the one by the other. And what contest or schism
is there, that God should divide the power that exists in Himself, and
overthrow one section of His power by the other. I suppose He could not
have dominion over His own power without the assistance to that end of
some greater and more violent power! Such is Eunomius’ God: a
being with double nature, or composite, dividing Himself against
Himself, having one power out of harmony with another, so that by one
He is urged to disorder, and by the other restrains this discordant
motion. Again, with what intent does He dominate the power that urges
on to generation? lest some evil should arise if generation be not
hindered? or rather let him explain this in the first place,—what
is that which is naturally under dominion? His language points to some
movement of impulse and choice, considered separately and
independently. For that which dominates must needs be one thing, that
which is dominated another. Now God “has dominion over His
power”—and this is—what? a self-determining nature?
or something else than this, pressing on to disquiet, or remaining in a
state of quiescence? Well, if he supposes it to be quiescent, that
which is tranquil needs no one to have dominion over it: and if he says
“He has dominion,” He “has dominion” clearly
over something which impels and is in motion: and this, I presume he
will say, is something naturally different from Him Who rules it. What
then, let him tell us, does he understand in this idea? Is it something
else besides God, considered as having an independent existence? How
can another existence be in God? Or is it some condition in the Divine
Nature considered as having an existence not its own? I hardly think he
would say so: for that which has no existence of its own is not: and
that which is not, is neither under dominion, nor set free from it.
What then is that power which was under dominion, and was restrained in
respect of its own activity, while the due time of the generation of
Christ was still about to come, and to set this power free to proceed
to its natural operation? What was the intervening cause of delay, for
which God deferred the generation of the Only-begotten, not thinking it
good as yet to become a Father? And what is this that is inserted as
intervening between the life of the Father and that of the Son, that is
not time nor space, nor any idea of extension, nor any like thing? To
what purpose is it that this keen and clear-sighted eye marks and
beholds the separation of the life of God in regard to the life of the
Son? When he is driven in all directions he is himself forced to admit
that the interval does not exist at all.