Chapter XXV.—The Poets and Philosophers Have Denied a Divine Providence.
These angels, then, who have fallen from heaven, and
haunt the air and the earth, and are no longer able to rise to heavenly
things, and the souls of the giants, which are the demons who wander
about the world, perform actions similar, the one (that is, the demons)
to the natures they have received, the other (that is, the angels) to
the appetites they have indulged. But the prince of matter, as may be
seen merely from what transpires, exercises a control and management
contrary to the good that is in God:—
“Ofttimes this anxious thought has crossed my mind,
Whether ’tis chance or deity that rules
The small affairs of men; and, spite of hope
As well as justice, drives to exile some
Stripped of all means of life, while others still
Continue to enjoy prosperity.”
790
Prosperity and adversity, contrary
to hope and justice, made it impossible for Euripides to say to whom
belongs the administration of earthly affairs, which is of such a kind
that one might say of it:—
“How then, while seeing these
things, can we say
There is a race of gods, or yield to laws?”
791
The same thing led Aristotle to say
that the things below the heaven are not under the care of Providence,
although the eternal providence of God concerns itself equally with
us below,—
“The earth, let willingness move her or not,
Must herbs produce, and thus sustain my flocks,”
792
—
and addresses itself to the deserving
individually, according to truth and not according to opinion; and
all other things, according to the general constitution of nature, are
provided for by the law of reason. But because the demoniac movements and
operations proceeding from the adverse spirit produce these disorderly
sallies, and moreover move men, some in one way and some in another,
as individuals and as nations, separately and in common, in accordance
with the tendency of matter on the one hand, and of the affinity for
divine things on the other, from within and from without,—some
who are of no mean reputation have therefore thought that this universe
is constituted without any definite order, and is driven hither and
thither by an irrational chance. But they do not understand, that of
those things which belong to the constitution of the whole world there
is nothing out of order or neglected, but that each one of them has been
produced by reason, and that, therefore, they do not transgress the order
prescribed to them; and that man himself, too, so far as He that made
him is concerned, is well ordered, both by his original nature, which
has one common character for all, and by the constitution of his body,
which does not transgress the law imposed upon
it, and by the termination of his life,
which remains equal and common to all alike;
793
but that, according to the
character peculiar to himself and the operation of the ruling prince and
of the demons his followers, he is impelled and moved in this direction
or in that, notwithstanding that all possess in common the same original
constitution of mind.
794
790
Eurip.; from an unknown play.
791
Ibid.
792
Eurip.,
Cycl
., 332 sq.
793
[Kaye, p. 190.]
794
Or,
“powers of reasoning” (
λογισμός
).