is at liberty to choose what kind of good it chooses to choose; supposing the act of choice itself
determined by an antecedent choice. The Liberty Mr. Chubb speaks of, is not only a man’s
power to move his body, agreeable to an antecedent act of choice, but to use or exert the
faculties of his soul. Thus, (p. 379.) speaking of the faculties of the mind, he says, “Man has
power, and is at liberty to neglect these faculties, to use them aright, or to abuse them, as he
pleases.” And that he supposes an act of choice or exercise of pleasure, properly distinct
from, and antecedent to, those acts thus chosen, directing, commanding, and producing
the chosen acts, and even the acts of choice themselves, is very plain in p. 283. “He can
command his actions; and herein consists his Liberty; he can give or deny himself that
pleasure, as he pleases. And p. 377. If the actions of men—are not the produce of a free choice,
or election, but spring from a necessity of nature,—he cannot in reason be the object of re-
ward or punishment on their account. Whereas, if action in man, whether good or evil, is
the produce of will or free choice; so that a man in either case, had it in his power, and was
at liberty to have chosen the contrary, he is the proper object of reward or punishment, ac-
cording as he chooses to behave himself.” Here, in these last words, he speaks of Liberty of
choosing according as he chooses. So that the behavior which he speaks of as subject to his
choice, is his choosing itself, as well as his external conduct consequent upon it. And therefore
it is evident, he means not only external actions, but the acts of choice themselves, when he
speaks of all free actions, as the produce of free choice. And this is abundantly evident in
what he says elsewhere, (p. 372, 373.)
Now these things imply a twofold great inconsistence.
1. To suppose, as Mr. Chubb plainly does, that every free act of choice is commanded
by, and is the produce of, free choice, is to suppose the first free act of choice belonging to
the case, yea, the first free act of choice that ever man exerted, to be the produce of an ante-
cedent act of choice. But I hope I need not labor at all to convince my readers, that it is an
absurdity to say, the very first act is the produce of another act that went before it.
2. If it were both possible and real, as Mr. Chubb insists, that every free act of choice
were the produce or the effect of a free act of choice; yet even then, according to his principles,
no one act of choice would be free, but every one necessary; because, every act of choice
being the effect of a foregoing act, every act would be necessarily connected with that fore-
going cause. For Mr. Chubb himself says, (p. 389.) “When the self-moving power is exerted,
it becomes the necessary cause of its effects.”—So that his notion of a free act, that is reward-
able or punishable, is a heap of contradictions. It is a free act, and yet, by his own notion of
freedom, is necessary; and therefore by him it is a contradiction, to suppose it to be free.
According to him, every free act is the produce of a free act; so that there must be an infinite
number of free acts in succession, without any beginning, in an agent that has a beginning.
And therefore here is an infinite number of free acts, every one of them free; and yet not
any one of them free, but every act in the whole infinite chain a necessary effect. All the acts
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SECTION X. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives;…