should even approve of Edwards’s definition, and still more “singular” to find them maintaining, in conformity
with his explanation of that definition, that supreme love to God is of the essence of true virtue. But so far are
their definitions from “coinciding,” that they differ toto cælo. A passionate attachment for the welfare of a
country, or “a passion for the general good,” in any sense wherein this expression can be ascribed to infidels, is
a representation not more different from that of President Edwards, than Mr. Hall is different from Voltaire or
D’Alembert. Our author’s meaning, as explained by himself, is as truly sublime as theirs is truly selfish and
contracted. For their definition had no regard to the Being of beings; but this adorable Being is necessarily included
in Mr. E’s definition, and essential to it. We say, is “included,” because the Supreme Being, together with every
derived existence, is contained in “being in general.” 2. If by “a metaphysical divine” be meant “a most acute
reasoner,” we feel no objection having the term “metaphysical” applied to our author, for few, if any, have deserved
it better. If error and absurdity appeal to metaphysical discussions, and involve the truth in a labyrinth of
sophisms, surely hard would be the case of a man who should be called by an opprobrious name, for venturing
into that labyrinth by the light of essential principles, in order to detect and expose false reasoning. 3. Mr. H.
objects to the sentiment, “that our love is always to be proportioned to the magnitude of its object in the scale
of being.” We presume, however, he will allow, that the whole system of being is in itself the most worthy of
being prized, other things being equal. But if so, the nature of true virtue requires this regard to the whole system
of being, compared with its parts. Nor does it follow from this, that the same principle in the progress of its
operations, disregards the smaller circle of attachments. Surely a virtuous person, loving God supremely, is not,
on that account, less qualified for personal and domestic duties. Besides, Mr. E. does not maintain that our love
is always to be proportioned to the magnitude of its object in the scale of being, except where other things are
equal. This he expressly and repeatedly mentions—“other things being equal.” To this important distinction
Mr. H. does not appear to have adverted; his representation of the case, therefore, is defective, and calculated
to mislead the unwary. 4. Mr. H’s statement in the first objection, does not distinguish between the nature of
the attachment and its force or degree. A little reflection will fully show, that these are entirely distinct consider-
ations. The greatest force, or the highest degree of attachment, may exist, when the nature of it is not at all vir-
tuous. If, indeed, attachment be made to include accurate knowledge, a divine relish, and deliberate esteem in
appreciating the worth of any object, then the degree of attachment may be justly considered as proportionate
to the “magnitude of the object in the scale of being,” but not otherwise. A truly virtuous mother, for instance,
may have a great force of affection for her child, or husband, and be more conscious of it than of her love to
God: but let her be put to the test of deliberate esteem, and she would sooner part with child, husband, or life
itself, than renounce her supreme love to God. 5. Our author’s representation of true virtue, by no means implies,
as Mr. H. supposes, that the degree or force of attachment, in its operation, should bear an exact proportion to
the magnitude of its object. The nature of virtue indeed is to be denominated according to its object, but its degree
must necessarily be measured pro captu agentis. The nature of love to God may be the same in the heart of a
child, as in that of an angel, because the object of it is the same: but the degree of it will be as differently varied
as the views and capacities of the subjects. It is not a little surprising how Mr. H. came to imagine, that our author
held the sentiment he is pleased to ascribe to him, a sentiment so absurd as to be held, we apprehend, by no
person in the world: a sentiment which requires an infinite force of affection from a finite being, an affection
equal in degree to that of his Maker. 6. So far is the exercise of virtue, according to Mr. E’s definition, from being
915
CHAPTER VII. The reasons of many mistakes