are called,” 2627 would seem to require to be understood as if there were one kind of wisdom,
carnal and material, and another according to the spirit, the former of which cannot indeed
be called wisdom, unless there be a soul of the flesh, which is wise in respect of what is called
carnal wisdom. And in addition to these passages they adduce the following: “Since the
flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh, so that we cannot do the
things that we would.” 2628 What are these things now respecting which he says, “that we
cannot do the things that we would?” It is certain, they reply, that the spirit cannot be in-
tended; for the will of the spirit suffers no hindrance. But neither can the flesh be meant,
because if it has not a soul of its own, neither can it assuredly possess a will. It remains,
then, that the will of this soul be intended which is capable of having a will of its own, and
which certainly is opposed to the will of the spirit. And if this be the case, it is established
that the will of the soul is something intermediate between the flesh and the spirit, un-
doubtedly obeying and serving that one of the two which it has elected to obey. And if it
yield itself up to the pleasures of the flesh, it renders men carnal; but when it unites itself
with the spirit, it produces men of the Spirit, and who on that account are termed spiritual.
And this seems to be the meaning of the apostle in the words, “But ye are not in the flesh,
but in the Spirit.” 2629
We have accordingly to ascertain what is this very will (intermediate) between flesh and
spirit, besides that will which is said to belong to the flesh or the spirit. For it is held as
339
certain, that everything which is said to be a work of the spirit is (a product of) the will of
the spirit, and everything that is called a work of the flesh (proceeds from) the will of the
flesh. What else then, besides these, is that will of the soul which receives a separate name,
2630 and which will, the apostle being opposed to our executing, says: “Ye cannot do the
things that ye would?” By this it would seem to be intended, that it ought to adhere to
neither of these two, i.e., to neither flesh nor spirit. But some one will say, that as it is better
for the soul to execute its own will than that of the flesh; so, on the other hand, it is better
to do the will of the spirit than its own will. How, then, does the apostle say, “that ye cannot
do the things that ye would?” Because in that contest which is waged between flesh and
2627 1 Cor. i. 26.
2628 Gal. v. 17.
2629 Rom. viii. 9.
2630 The text here is very obscure, and has given some trouble to commentators. The words are: “Quæ ergo
ista est præter hæc voluntas animæ quæ extrinsecus nominatur,” etc. Redepenning understands “extrinsecus”
as meaning “seorsim,” “insuper,” and refers to a note of Origen upon the Epistle to the Romans (tom. i. p. 466):
“Et idcirco extrinsecus eam (animam, corporis et spiritus mentione factâ, Rom. i. 3, 4) apostolus non nominat,
sed carnem tantum vel spiritum,” etc. Schnitzer supposes that in the Greek the words were, Τῆς ἔξω καλουμένης,
where ἔξω is to be taken in the sense of κάτω, so that the expression would mean “anima inferior.”
745
On Human Temptations.