But I fear that all we shall
find in the discourse of Eunomius will turn out to be mere tumours and
sea lungs, so that what has been said must necessarily close our
argument, as his writings will supply no material to work on. For as a
smoke or a mist makes the air in which it resides heavy and thick, and
incapacitates the eye for the discharge of its natural function, yet
does not form itself into so dense a body that he who will may grasp
and hold it in his palms, and offer resistance to its stroke, so if one
should say the same of his pompous piece of writing, the comparison
would not be untrue. Much nonsense is worked up in his tumid and
viscous discourse, and to one not gifted with over-much discernment,
like a mist to one viewing it from afar, it seems to have some
substance and shape, but if you come up to it and scrutinize what is
said, the theories slip from your hold like smoke, and vanish into
nothing, nor have they any solidity or resistance to oppose to the
stroke of your argument. It is difficult, therefore, to know what to
do. For to those who like to complain either alternative will seem
objectionable; whether, leaping over his empty wordiness, as over a
ravine, we direct the course of our argument to the level and open
country, against those points which seem to have any strength against
the truth, or form our absurd battle along the whole line of his
inanities. For in the latter case, to those who do not love hard work,
our labour, extending over some thousands of lines to no useful
purpose, will be wearisome and unprofitable. But if we attack those
points only which seem to have some force against the truth, we shall
give occasion to our adversaries to accuse us of passing over arguments
of theirs which we are unable to refute. Since, then, two courses are
open to us, either to take all their arguments seriatim, or to run
through those only which are more important—the one course
tedious to our hearers, the other liable to be suspected by our
assailants—I think it best to take a middle course, and so, as
far as possible, to avoid censure on either hand. What, then, is our
method? After clearing his vain productions, as well as we can, of the
rubbish they have accumulated, we will summarily run through the main
points of his argument in such a way as neither to plunge needlessly
into the profundities of his nonsense, nor to leave any of his
statements unexamined. Now his whole treatise is an ambitious attempt
to show that God speaks after the manner of men, and that the Creator
of all things gives them suitable names, indicative of the things
themselves. And, therefore, opposing himself to him who contended that
such names are given by that rational nature which we have received
from God, he accuses him of error, and of desertion from his
fundamental proposition: and having brought this charge against him, he
uses the following arguments in support of his position.