much as to say, that it must he necessary, being dependent upon, and determined by,
something foregoing; namely, a foregoing act of choice. Again, it belongs to their notion of
Action, that it is the beginning of motion, or of exertion of power; but yet it is implied in
their notion of Action, that it is not the beginning of motion or exertion of power, but is
consequent and dependent on a preceding exertion of power, viz. the power of Will and
choice: for they say there is no proper Action but what is freely chosen; or, which is the same
thing, determined by a foregoing act of free choice. But if any of them shall see cause to
deny this, and say they hold no such thing as that every Action is chosen or determined by
a foregoing choice; but that the very first exertion of Will only, undetermined by any pre-
ceding act, is properly called Action; then I say, such a man’s notion of Action implies ne-
cessity; for what the mind is the subject of, without the determination of its own previous
choice, it is the subject of necessarily, as to any hand that free choice has in the affair; and
without any ability the mind has to prevent it, by any will or election of its own; because by
the supposition it precludes all previous acts of the Will or choice in the case, which might
prevent it. So that it is again, in this other way, implied in their notion of act, that it is both
necessary and not necessary, Again it belongs to their notion of an act, that it is no effect of
a predetermining bias or preponderation, but springs immediately out of indifference; and
this implies, that it cannot be from foregoing choice, which is foregoing preponderation: if
it be not habitual, but occasional, yet if it causes the act, it is truly previous, efficacious, and
determining. And yet, at the same time, it is essential to their notion of the act, that it is
what the agent is the author of freely and voluntarily, and that is, by previous choice and
design.
So that, according to their notion of the act, considered with regard to its consequences,
these following things are all essential to it; viz. That it should be necessary, and not necessary;
that it should be from a cause, and no cause; that it should be the fruit of choice and design,
and not the fruit of choice and design; that it should he the beginning of motion or exertion,
and yet consequent on previous exertion; that it should be before it is; that it should spring
immediately out of indifference and equilibrium, and yet be the effect of preponderation;
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that it should be self-originated, and also have its original from something else; that it is
what the mind causes itself, of its own will, and can produce or prevent, according to its
choice or pleasure, and yet what the mind has no power to prevent, precluding all previous
choice in the affair.
So that an act, according to their metaphysical notion of it, is something of which there
is no idea; it is nothing but a confusion of the mind, excited by words without any distinct
meaning, and is an absolute nonentity; and that in two respects: (1.) There is nothing in the
world that ever was, is, or can be, to answer the things which must belong to its description,
according to what they suppose to be essential to it. And, (2.) There neither is, nor ever was,
nor can be, any notion or idea to answer the word, as they use and explain it. For, if we
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SECTION II. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical notion…