Section VII.
Concerning The Necessity Of The Divine Will
Some may possibly object against what has been supposed of the absurdity and
inconsistence of a self-determining power in the will, and the impossibility of
its being otherwise than that the will should be determined in every case by some
motive, and by a motive which (as it stands in the view of the understanding) is
of superior strength to any appearing on the other side; that if these things are
true, it will follow, that not only the will of created minds, but the will of God
himself, is necessary in all its determinations. Concerning which, says the author
of the Essay on the Freedom of Will in God and in the Creature, (pp. 85, 86) “What
strange doctrine is this, contrary to all our ideas of the dominion of God? does
it not destroy the glory of his liberty of choice, and take away from the Creator
and Governor and Benefactor of the world, that most free and sovereign agent, all
the glory of this sort of freedom? does it not seem to make him a kind of mechanical
medium of fate, and introduce Mr. Hobbe’s doctrine of fatality and necessity into
all things that God hath to do with? Does it not seem to represent the blessed God
as a being of vast understanding, as well as power and efficiency, but still to
leave him without a will to choose among all the objects within his view? In short,
it seems to make the blessed God a sort of almighty minister of fate, under its
universal and supreme influence; as it was the professed sentiment of some of the
ancients, that fate was above the gods.”
This is declaiming, rather than
arguing; and an application to men’s imaginations and prejudices, rather than to
mere reason. But I would calmly endeavour to consider, whether there be any reason
in this frightful representation.— But before I enter upon a particular consideration
of the matter, I should observe this: that it is reasonable to suppose, it should
be much more difficult to express or conceive things according to exact metaphysical
truth, relating to the nature and manner of the existence of things in the Divine
understanding and will, and the operation of these faculties (if I may so call them)
of the Divine mind, than in the human mind; which is infinitely more within our
view, and nearer to a proportion to the measure of our comprehension, and more commensurate
to the use and import of human speech. Language is indeed very deficient in regard
of terms to express precise truth concerning our own minds, and their faculties
and operations. Words were first formed to express external things; and those that
are applied to express things internal and spiritual, are almost all borrowed, and
used in a sort of figurative sense. Whence they are, most of them, attended with
a great deal of ambiguity and unfixedness in their signification, occasioning innumerable
doubts, difficulties, and confusions, in inquiries and controversies about things
of this nature. But language is much less adapted to express things in the mind
of the incomprehensible Deity precisely as they are.
We find a great deal of difficulty
in conceiving exactly of the nature of our own souls. And notwithstanding all the
progress which has been made, in past and present ages, in this kind of knowledge,
whereby our metaphysics, as it relates to these things, is brought to greater perfection
than once it was; yet, here is still work enough left for future inquiries and researches,
and room for progress still to be made, for many ages and generations. But we had
need to be infinitely able metaphysicians, to conceive with clearness, according
to strict, proper, and perfect truth, concerning the nature of the Divine Essence,
and the modes of the action and operation of the powers of the Divine Mind.
And it may be noted particularly,
that though we are obliged to conceive of some things in God as consequent and dependent
on others, and of some things pertaining to the Divine nature and will as the foundation
of others, and so before others in the order of nature; as, we must conceive of
the knowledge and holiness of God as prior, in the order of nature, to his happiness;
the perfection of his understanding, as the foundation of his wise purposes and
decrees; the holiness of his nature, as the cause and reason of his holy determinations.
And yet, when we speak of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, fundamental
and dependent, determining and determined, in the first Being, who is self-existent,
independent, of perfect and absolute simplicity and immutability, and the first
cause of all things; doubtless there must be less propriety in such representations,
than when we speak of derived dependent beings, who are compounded, and liable to
perpetual mutation and succession.
Having premised this, I proceed
to observe concerning the fore-mentioned author’s exclamation about the necessary
determination of God’s will, in all things, by what he sees to be fittest and best.
That all the seeming force of such
objections and exclamations must arise from an imagination that there is some sort
of privilege or dignity in being without such a moral necessity as will make it
impossible to do any other than always choose what is wisest and best; as though
there were some disadvantage, meanness, and subjection, in such a necessity; a thing
by which the will was confined, kept under, and held in servitude by something,
which, as it were, maintained a strong and invincible power and dominion over it,
by bonds that held him fast, and that he could, by no means, deliver himself from.
Whereas, this must be all mere imagination and delusion. It is no disadvantage or
dishonour to a being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy manner,
from the necessary perfection of his own nature. This argues no imperfection, inferiority,
or dependence, nor any want of dignity, privilege, or ascendancy. It is not inconsistent
with the absolute and most perfect sovereignty of God. The sovereignty of God is
his ability and authority to do whatever pleases him; whereby “he doth according
to his will in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth; and
none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What dost thou?” — The following things
belong to the sovereignty of God: viz.
(1.) Supreme, universal, and infinite power:
whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without control, without any confinement
of that power, without any subjection, in the least measure, to any other power;
and so without any hindrance or restraint, that it should be either impossible,
or at all difficult, for him to accomplish his will; and without any dependance
of his power on any other power, from whence it should be derived, or which it should
stand in any need of; so far from this, that all other power is derived from him,
and is absolutely dependent on him.
(2.) That he has supreme authority; absolute
and most perfect right to do what he wills, without subjection to any superior authority,
or any derivation of authority from any other, or limitation by any distinct independent
authority, either superior, equal, or inferior; he being the head of all dominion,
and fountain of all authority; and also without restraint by any obligation, implying
either subjection, derivation, or dependence, or proper limitation.
(3.) That his will is supreme, underived,
and independent on any thing without himself; being in every thing determined by
his own counsel, having no other rule but his own wisdom; his will not being subject
to, or restrained by, the will of any other, and other wills being perfectly subject
to his.
(4.) That his wisdom, which determines
his will, is supreme, perfect, underived, self-sufficient, and independent; so that
it may be said, as in
Isaiah 40:14
, ' With whom took he counsel, and who instructed
him, and taught him in the path of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and showed
to him the way of understanding? —There is no other Divine sovereignty but this;
and this is properly absolute sovereignty: no other is desirable; nor would any
other be honourable or happy and, indeed, there is no other conceivable or possible:
It is the glory and greatness of the Divine Sovereign, that God’s will is determined
by his own infinite, all-sufficient wisdom in every thing; and in nothing at all
is either directed by any inferior wisdom, or by no wisdom; whereby it would become
senseless arbitrariness, determining and acting without reason, design, or end.
If God’s will is steadily and surely
determined in every thing by supreme wisdom, then it is in every thing necessarily
determined to that which is most wise. And, certainly, it would he a disadvantage
and indignity to be otherwise. For if the Divine will was not necessarily determined
to that which, in every case, is wisest and best, it must be subject, to some degree
of undesigning contingence; and so in the same degree liable to evil. To suppose
the Divine will liable to be carried hither and thither at random, by the uncertain
wind of blind contingence, which is guided by no wisdom, no motive, no intelligent
dictate whatsoever, (if any such thing were possible,) would certainly argue a great
degree of imperfection and meanness, infinitely unworthy of the Deity. If it be
a disadvantage for the Divine will to be attended with this moral necessity, then
the more free from it, and the more left at random, the greater dignity and advantage.
And, consequently, to be perfectly free from the direction of understanding, and
universally and entirely left to senseless, unmeaning contingence, to act absolutely
at random, would be the supreme glory.
It no more argues any dependence
of God’s will, that his supremely wise volition is necessary, than it argues a dependence
of his being, that his existence is necessary. If it be something too low for the
Supreme Being to have his will determined by moral necessity, so as necessarily,
in every case, to will in the highest degree holy and happily; then why is it not
also something too low for him to have his existence, and the infinite perfection
of his nature, and his infinite happiness, determined by necessity? It is no more
to God’s dishonour to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily holy. And if neither
of them be to his dishonour, then it is not to his dishonour necessarily to act
holily and wisely. And if it be not dishonorable to be necessarily holy and wise,
in the highest possible degree, no more is it mean and dishonorable, necessarily
to act holily and wisely in the highest possible degree; or, which is the same thing,
to do that, in every case, which, above all other things, is wisest and best.
The reason why it is not dishonorable
to be necessarily most holy, is, because holiness in itself is an excellent and
honourable thing. For the same reason, it is no dishonour to be necessarily most
wise, and, in every case, to act most wisely, or do the thing which is the wisest
of all; for wisdom is also in itself excellent and honourable.
The fore-mentioned author of the
“Essay on the Freedom of Will,” &c. as has been observed, represents that doctrine
of the Divine Will’s being in every thing necessarily determined by a superior fitness,
as making the blessed God a kind of almighty minister and mechanical medium of fate;
and he insists, (pp. 93, 94,) that this moral necessity and impossibility is, in
effect, the same thing with physical and natural necessity and impossibility; and
in pp. 54, 55, he says, “The scheme which determines the will always and certainly
by the understanding, and understanding by the appearance of things, seems to take
away the true nature of vice and virtue. For the sublimest of virtues, and the vilest
of vices, seem rather to be matters of fate and necessity, flowing naturally and
necessarily from the existence, the circumstances, and present situation of persons
and things; for this existence and situation necessarily makes such an appearance
to the mind; from this appearance flows a necessary perception and judgment concerning
these things: this judgment necessarily determines the will; and thus, by this chain
of necessary causes, virtue and vice would lose their nature, and become natural
ideas, and necessary things, instead of moral and free actions.”
And yet this same author allows,
(pp. 30, 31,) that a perfectly wise being will constantly and certainly choose what
is most fit; and says, pp. 102, 103, “I grant, and always have granted, that wheresoever
there is such antecedent superior fitness of things, God acts according to it, so
as never to contradict it; and, particularly, in all his judicial proceedings as
a governor, and distributor of rewards and punishments.” Yea, he says expressly,
(p. 42,) “That it is not possible for God to act otherwise than according to this
fitness and goodness in things.”
So that, according to this author,
putting these several passages of this essay together, there is no virtue, nor any
thing of a moral nature, in the most sublime and glorious acts and exercises of
God’s holiness, justice, and faithfulness; and he never does any thing which is
in itself supremely worthy, and, above all other things, fit and excellent, but
only as a kind of mechanical medium of fate; and in what he does as the judge and
moral governor of the world, he exercises no moral excellency, exercising no freedom
in these things, because he acts by moral necessity, which is, in effect, the same
with physical or natural necessity; and therefore he only acts by an Hobbistical
fatality; “as a being indeed of vast understanding, as well as power and efficiency,
(as he said before,) but without a will to choose, being a kind of almighty administer
of fate, acting under its supreme influence.” For he allows, that in all these things,
God’s will is determined constantly and certainly by a superior fitness, and that
it is not possible for him to act otherwise. And if these things are so, what glory
or praise belongs to God for doing holily and justly; or taking the most fit, holy,
wise, and excellent course, in any one instance? Whereas, according to the Scriptures,
and also the common sense of mankind, it does not, in the least, derogate from the
honour of any being, that through the moral perfection of his nature he necessarily
acts with supreme wisdom and holiness; but on the contrary, his praise is the greater;
herein consists the height of his glory.
The same author (p. 56) supposes
that herein appears the excellent “character of a wise and good man, that though
he can choose contrary to the fitness of things, yet he does not; but suffers himself
to be directed by fitness;” and that, in this conduct, “he imitates the blessed
God.” And yet he supposes it is contrariwise with the blessed God; not that he suffers
himself to be directed by fitness, when he can choose, contrary to the fitness of
things, but that he cannot choose contrary to the fitness of things; as he says,
(p. 42,) “that it is not possible for God to act otherwise than according to this
fitness, where there is any fitness or goodness in things.” Yea, he supposes, (p.
31,) that if a man “were perfectly wise and good, he could not do otherwise than
be constantly and certainly determined by the fitness of things.”
One thing more I would observe,
before I conclude this section; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the
glory of God to be necessarily determined by superior fitness in some things, then
neither does it to be thus determined in all things; from any thing in the nature
of such necessity, as at all detracting from God’s freedom, independence, absolute
supremacy, or any dignity or glory of his nature, state, or manner of acting; or
as implying any infirmity, restraint, or subjection. And if the thing be such as
well consists with God’s glory, and has nothing tending at all to detract from it;
then we need not be afraid of ascribing it to God in too many things, lest thereby
we should detract from God’s glory too much.