Chrys. therefore explains these sayings of our Lord (polemically
against the Arians) as οἰκονομία: i.e. the thing said is not objectively true, but the
morality of all actions depends on the subjective condition of
the προαίρεσις
or purpose (παρὰ τὴν τῶν
χρωμένων
προαίρεσιν
γιγνεται
φαῦλον ἢ
καλὸν, de Sacerdot.
1. 8.), so that where this is right and good, a deception is lawful.
This lax view of the morality of Truth was very general in the Greek
Church: not so in the early Latin Church. See the two Treatises of St.
Augustine, De Mendacio (“Lib. of Fathers,”
Seventeen Short Treatises of St. Aug.) The stricter doctrine
however is maintained by St. Basil, who in his shorter Monastic Rule
peremptorily condemns all οἰκονομία, and pious fraud (officiosium mendacium) of every
description, on. the ground that all falsehood is from Satan,
John v. 44.
and that our Lord has made no distinction between one sort of lying and
another. Again, the monk Johannes of Lycopolis in Egypt: “All
falsehood is foreign from Christ and Christian men, be it in a small or
in a great matter: yea, though a good end be served by it, it is never
to be allowed, for the Saviour hath declared, that all lying is from
the Wicked One.” Pallad, Hist. Lausiac in Bibl. Patr. t.
xiii. p. 965.