or the other virtues, depend on fate? From whence, if so, do their contraries, as injustice
and intemperance, proceed? For vice has its origin from nature, not from fate; and virtue
is the due regulation of natural character and disposition. But, granting that the varied results
of actions, whether right or erroneous in themselves, depend on fortune or fate: in what
sense can the general principle of justice,3394 the principle of rendering to every one his
due, be ascribed to fate?3395 Or how can it be said that laws, encouragements to virtue and
dissuasives from what is evil, praise, blame, punishment, in short whatever operates as a
motive to virtue, and deters from the practice of vice, derive their origin from fortune or
accident, and not rather from that of justice,3396 which is a characteristic attribute of the
God of providence? For the events which befall men are consequent upon the tenor of their
lives. Hence pestilence or sedition, famine and plenty, succeed in turn, declaring plainly
and emphatically that all these things are regulated with reference to our course of life. For
the Divine Being delights in goodness, but turns with aversion from all impiety; looks with
acceptance on the humble spirit, but abhors presumption, and that pride which exalts itself
above what becomes a creature. And though the proofs of these truths are clear and manifest
to our sight, they appear in a still stronger light, when we collect, and as it were concentrate
our thoughts within ourselves, and ponder their causes with deep attention. I say, then, that
it becomes us to lead a life of modesty and gentleness, not suffering our thoughts to rise
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proudly above our natural condition, and ever mindful that God is near us, and is the ob-
server of all our actions. But let us still farther test the truth of the proposition, that the order
of the universe depends on chance3397 or accident.3398 Are we then to suppose that the stars
and other heavenly bodies, the earth and sea, fire and wind, water and air, the succession
of the seasons, the recurrence of summer and winter, that all these have an undesigned and
fortuitous existence, and not rather that they proceed from the creative hand of God? Some,
indeed, are so senseless as to say that most of these things have been devised by mankind
because of their need of them. Let it be admitted that this opinion has a semblance of reason
in regard to earthly and corruptible things (though Nature herself supplies every good with
3394 τὶ δίκαιον, not δικαιοσύνη
3395 This is very free, and follows translation of Valesius and 1709 text. 1709 marg. translates more literally,
“But either crimes, or, on the other hand, brave performances, which are [the property] of a good and right
purpose of mind, if they happen sometimes one way, at others another,” and Molz. somewhat similarly. It is
possible that it should read: “Granted that either evil actions proceeding from a good and upright will, or con-
trariwise, good actions [from an evil will] which issue directly contrary [to their own nature or to just expectation]
may be ascribed to chance or fate, how can the right,” &c.
3396 δικαιοσύνη
3397 τύχη.
3398 αὐτόματον
1438
The Falsity of the General Opinion respecting Fate is proved by the Consideration…