How comes it, therefore, that
Eunomius, when the Divine generation is the subject for discourse,
leaves his subject, and discusses at length the things of earth, when
on this matter we have no dispute with him? Surely our
craftsman’s aim is clear,—that by the slanderous
insinuation of passion he may raise an objection to the generation of
the Lord. And here I pass by the blasphemous nature of his view, and
admire the man for his acuteness,—how mindful he is of his own
zealous endeavour, who, having by his previous statements established
the theory that the Son must be, and must be called, a “product
of generation,” now contends for the view that we ought not to
entertain regarding Him the conception of generation. For, if all
generation, as this author imagines, has linked with it the condition
of passion, we are hereby absolutely compelled to admit that what is
foreign to passion is alien also from generation: for if these things,
passion and generation, are considered as conjoined, He that has no
share in the one would not have any participation in the other. How
then does he call Him a “product” by reason of His
generation, of Whom he tries to show by the arguments he now uses, that
He was not generated? and for what cause does he fight against our
master i.e.S. Basil., who counsels us in matters of Divine
doctrine not to presume in name-making, but to confess that He is
generated without transforming this conception into the formula of a
name, so as to call Him Who is generated “a product of
generation,” as this term is properly applied in Scripture to
things inanimate, or to those which are mentioned “as a figure of
wickedness The
reference is to S. Basil’s treatise against Eunomius (ii.
7–8; p. 242–4 in the Benedictine ed.). Oehler’s
punctuation is apparently wrong, for Gregory paraphrases not only the
rule, but the reason given for it, from S. Basil, from whom the last
words of the sentence are a direct quotation.”? When we speak of the propriety
of avoiding the use of the term “product,” he prepares for
action that invincible rhetoric of his, and takes also to support him
his frigid grammatical phraseology, and by his skilful misuse of names,
or equivocation, or whatever one may properly call his
processes—by these means, I say, he brings his syllogisms to
their conclusion, “not refusing to call Him Who is begotten by
the name of ‘product of generation.’” Then, as soon
as we admit the term, and proceed to examine the conception involved in
the name, on the theory that thereby is vindicated the community of
essence, he again retracts his own words, and contends for the view
that the “product of generation” is not generated, raising
an objection by his foul account of bodily generation, against the pure
and Divine and passionless generation of the Son, on the ground that it
is not possible that the two things, the true relationship to the
Father, and exemption of His nature from passion, should be found to
coincide in God, but that, if there were no passion, there would be no
generation, and that, if one should acknowledge the true relationship,
he would thereby, in admitting generation, certainly admit passion
also.