ation. But this comes to just the same thing as if they said, that the apostle only means to
exclude the works of the ceremonial law; for when they say, that it is intended only that we
are not justified by the works of the Mosaic dispensation, if they mean any thing by it, it
must be, that we are not justified by attending and observing what is Mosaic in that dispens-
ation, or by what was peculiar to it, and wherein it differed from the christian dispensation;
which is the same as that which is ceremonial and positive, and not moral, in that adminis-
tration. So that this is what I have to disprove, viz. that the apostle, when he speaks of works
of the law in this affair, means only works of the ceremonial law, or those observances that
were peculiar to the Mosaic administration.
And here it must be noted, that nobody controverts it with them, whether the works of
the ceremonial law be not included, or whether the apostle does not particularly argue
against justification by circumcision, and other ceremonial observances; but all in question
is, whether, when he denies justification by works of the law, he is to be understood only of
the ceremonial law, or whether the moral law be not also implied and intended; and therefore
those arguments which are brought to prove that the apostle meant the ceremonial law, are
nothing to the purpose, unless they prove that the apostle meant those only.
What is much insisted on is, that it was the judaizing Christians being so fond of circum-
cision, and other ceremonies of the law, and depending so much on them, which was the
very occasion of the apostle’s writing as he does against justification by the works of the law.
But supposing it were so, that their trusting in works of the ceremonial law were the sole
occasion of the apostle’s writing, (which yet there is no reason to allow, as may appear after-
wards,) if their trusting in a particular work, as a work of righteousness, was all that gave
occasion to the apostle to write, how does it follow, that therefore the apostle did not upon
that occasion write against trusting in all works of righteousness whatsoever? Where is the
absurdity of supposing that the apostle might take occasion, from his observing some to
trust in a certain work as a work of righteousness, to write to them against persons trusting
in any works or righteousness at all, and that it was a very proper occasion too? Yea, it would
have been unavoidable for the apostle to have argued against trusting in a particular work,
in the quality of a work of righteousness, which quality was general, but he must therein
argue against trusting in works of righteousness in general. Supposing it had been some
other particular sort of works that was the occasion of the apostle’s writing, as for instance,
works of charity, and the apostle should hence take occasion to write to them not to trust
in their works, could the apostle by that be understood of no other works besides works of
charity? Would it have been absurd to understand him as writing against trusting in any
work at all, because it was their trusting to a particular work that gave occasion to his writing?
Another thing alleged, as an evidence that the apostle means the ceremonial law—when
he says, we cannot be justified by the works of the law—is, that he uses this argument to
prove it, viz. that the law he speaks of was given so long after the covenant with Abraham,
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DISCOURSE. I. Justification by Faith alone.