Testimonia

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SECT. II. Concerning the Determination of the Will. By determining the Will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended, causing that the act of the Will or choice should be thus, and not otherwise: and the Will is said to be determined, when, in consequence of some action, or influence, its choice is dir- ected to, and fixed upon a particular object. As when we speak of the determination of mo- tion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be in such a direction, rather than another. The Determination of the Will, supposes an effect, which must have a cause. If the Will be determined, there is a Determiner. This must be supposed to be intended even by them that say, The Will determines itself. If it be so, the Will is both Determiner and determined; it is a cause that acts and produces effects upon itself, and is the object of its own influence and action. With respect to that grand inquiry, “What determines the Will?’’ it would be very tedious and unnecessary, at present, to examine all the various opinions, which have been advanced concerning this matter; nor is it needful that I should enter into a particular discussion of all points debated in disputes on that other question, “Whether the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding?” It is sufficient to my present purpose to say, It is that motive, which, as it stands in view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the Will. But 6 may be necessary that I should a little explain my meaning. By motive I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur, and unite their strength, to induce the mind; and when it is so, all together are as one complex motive. And when I speak of the strongest motive, I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce a particular act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together. Whatever is objectively 107 a motive, in this sense, must, be something that is extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act any thing, any further than it is perceived, or is some way or other in the mind’s view; for what is wholly unperceived and perfectly out of the mind’s 107 This appears to be the author’s meaning, in order to preserve a consistency with his professed sentiment of divine influence. He believed that a real Christian’s mind is born of the Spirit; and that such a state of mind induces one choice rather than another. But he could not maintain that divine influences, which is a subjective cause of one volition rather than another, must be “in the view or apprehension of the of the understanding.” For “the wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, wither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit.” Beside, the most proper acceptation of the term “motive” seems to plead in favor of the restriction suggested in the text by the word “objectively;” and the use of this dis- tinction may appear more fully hereafter. W. SECTION II. Concerning the Determination of the Will. 521 SECTION II. Concerning the Determination of the Will.

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