of the contrary opinion, as absurd and self-contradictory, will appear by the following words,
in his Discourse on the Five Points. 120
“Now, it is certain, that what naturally makes the Understanding to perceive, is evidence
proposed, and apprehended, considered or adverted to: for nothing else can be requisite to
make us come to the knowledge of the truth. Again, what makes the Will choose, is something
approved by the Understanding; and consequently appearing to the soul as good. And
whatsoever it refuseth, is something represented by the Understanding, and so appearing
to the Will, as evil. Whence all that God requires of us is and can be only this; to refuse the
evil, and choose the good. Wherefore, to say that evidence proposed, apprehended, and
considered, is not sufficient to make the Understanding approve; or that the greatest good
proposed, the greatest evil threatened, when equally believed and reflected on, is not sufficient
to engage the Will to choose the good and refuse the evil, is in effect to say, that which alone
doth move the Will to choose or to refuse, is not sufficient to engage it so to do; which being
contradictory to itself, must of necessity be false. Be it then so, that we naturally have an
aversion to the truths proposed to us in the gospel; that only can make us indisposed to attend
to them, but cannot hinder our conviction, when we do apprehend them, and attend to
them.—Be it, that there is in us also a renitency to the good we are to choose; that only can
indispose us to believe it is, and to approve it as our chiefest good. Be it, that we are prone
to the evil that we should decline; that only can render it the more difficult for us to believe
it is the worst of evils. But yet, what we do really believe to be our chiefest good, will still be
chosen; and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils, will, whilst we do continue under that
conviction, be refused by us. It therefore can be only requisite, in order to these ends, that
the Good Spirit should so illuminate our Understandings, that we attending to and consid-
ering what lies before us, should apprehend and be convinced of our duty; and that the
blessings of the gospel should be so propounded to us, as that we may discern them to be
our chiefest good; and the miseries it threateneth, so as we may be convinced that they are
the worst of evils; that we may choose the one, and refuse the other.”
Here let it be observed, how plainly and peremptorily it is asserted, that the greatest
good proposed, and the greatest evil threatened, when equally believed and reflected on, is
sufficient to engage the Will to choose the good, and refuse the evil, and is that alone which
doth move the Will to choose or to refuse; and that it is contradictory to itself, to suppose
otherwise; and therefore must of necessity be false; and then what we do really believe to be
our chiefest good will still be chosen, and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils, will,
whilst we continue under that conviction, be refused by us. Nothing could have been said
more to the purpose, fully to signify, that the determinations of the Will must evermore
follow the illumination, conviction, and notice of the Understanding, with regard to the
120 Second Edit. P. 211, 212, 213.
578
SECTION IX. Of the Connexion of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates…