If it should be objected, that virtue consists primarily in benevolence, but that our fellow-
creatures, and not God, seem to be the most proper objects of our benevolence; inasmuch
as our goodness extendeth not to God, and we cannot be profitable to him.—To this I answer,
1. A benevolent propensity of heart is exercised, not only in seeking to promote the
happiness of the being towards whom it is exercised, but also in rejoicing in his happiness.
Even as gratitude for benefits received will not only excite endeavours to requite the kindness
we receive, by equally benefiting our benefactor, but also if he be above any need of us, or
we have nothing to bestow, and are unable to repay his kindness, it will dispose us to rejoice
in his prosperity.
2. Though we are not able to give any thing to God, which we have of our own, inde-
pendently; yet we may be the instruments of promoting his glory, in which he takes a true
and proper delight. 228 —Whatever influence such an objection may seem to have on the
minds of some, yet is there any that owns the being of a God, who will deny that any bene-
volent affection is due to God, and proper to be exercised towards him? If no benevolence
is to be exercised towards God, because we cannot profit him, then, for the same reason,
neither is gratitude to be exercised towards him for his benefits to us; because we cannot
requite him. But where is the man, who believes a God and a providence, that will say this?
There seems to be an inconsistence in some writers on morality, in this respect, that
they do not wholly exclude a regard to the Deity out of their schemes of morality, but yet
mention it so slightly, that they leave me room and reason to suspect they esteem it a less
important and subordinate part of true morality; and insist on benevolence to the created
system, in such a manner as would naturally lead one to suppose they look upon that as by
far the most important and essential thing in their scheme. But why should this be? If true
virtue consists partly in a respect to God, then doubtless it consists chiefly in it. If true
morality requires that we should have some regard, some benevolent affection to our Creator,
as well as to his creatures, then doubtless it requires the first regard to be paid to him; and
that he be every way the supreme object of our benevolence. If his being above our reach,
and beyond all capacity of being profited by us, does not hinder, but that nevertheless he is
the proper object of our love, then it does not hinder that he should be loved according to
his dignity, or according to the degree in which he has those things wherein worthiness of
regard consists, so far as we are capable of it. But this worthiness, none will deny, consists
in these two things, greatness and moral goodness. And those that own a God, do not deny
228 As was shown at large in the former treatise, on God’s end in creating the world, Chap. 1. sect. 4. whither
I must refer the reader for a more full answer to this objection.
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CHAPTER II. How love respects different beings.