5. From all that has been observed concerning this secondary kind of beauty, it appears,
that the disposition, which consists in a determination of mind to approve and be pleased
with this beauty, considered simply and by itself, has nothing of the nature of true virtue,
and is entirely a different thing from a truly virtuous taste. For it has been shown, that this
kind of beauty is entirely diverse from the beauty of true virtue, whether it takes place in
material or immaterial things; and therefore it will follow, that a taste of this kind of beauty
is entirely a different thing from a taste of true virtue. Who will affirm, that a disposition to
approve of the harmony of good music, or the beauty of a square, or equilateral triangle, is
the same with true holiness, or a truly virtuous disposition of mind? It is a relish of uniformity
and proportion that determines the mind to approve these things. And there is no need of
any thing higher, or of any thing in any respect diverse, to determine the mind to approve
and be pleased with equal uniformity and proportion among spiritual things which are
equally discerned. It is virtuous to love true virtue, as that denotes an agreement of the heart
with virtue. But it argues no virtue for the heart to be pleased with that which is entirely
distinct from it.
Though it be true, that there is some analogy in it to spiritual and virtuous beauty—as
far as material things can have analogy to things spiritual, of which they can have no more
than a shadow—yet, as has been observed, men do not approve it because of any such analogy
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perceived. And not only reason but experience plainly shows, that men’s approbation of
this sort of beauty does not spring from any virtuous temper, and has no connexion with
virtue. For otherwise their delight in the beauty of squares, and cubes, and regular polygons,
in the regularity of buildings, and the beautiful figures in a piece of embroidery, would in-
crease in proportion to men’s virtue; and would be raised to a great height in some eminently
virtuous or holy men; but would be almost wholly lost in some others that are very vicious
and lewd. It is evident in fact, that a relish of these things does not depend on general bene-
volence, or any benevolence at all to any being whatsoever, any more than a man’s loving
the taste of honey, or his being pleased with the smell of a rose. A taste of this inferior beauty
in things immaterial, is one thing which has been mistaken by some moralists, for a true
virtuous principle, supposed to be implanted naturally in the hearts of all mankind.
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CHAPTER III. Concerning the secondary beauty.