CHAP. XVI. CHRISTIAN RELIGION. 243
cannot be a greater absurdity than to hold that anything is
done without the ordination of God ; because it would hap
pen at random. For which reason, he also excludes the
contingency which depends on human will, maintaining a
little further on, in clearer terms, that no cause must be
sought for but the will of God. When he uses the term
permission, the meaning which he attaches to it will best
appear from a single passage, (De Trinit. Lib. iii. cap. 4,)
where he proves that the will of God is the supreme and
primary cause of all things, because nothing happens with
out his order or permission. He certainly does not figure
God sitting idly in a watch-tower, when he chooses to
permit anything. The will which he represents as inter
posing is, if I may so express it, active, (actualis,) and but
for this could not be regarded as a cause.
9. But since our sluggish minds rest far beneath the height
of Divine Providence, we must have recourse to a distinction
which may assist them in rising. I say then, that though
all things are ordered by the counsel and certain arrangement
of God, to us, however, they are fortuitous, — not because we
imagine that Fortune rules the world and mankind, and turns
all things upside down at random, (far be such a heartless
thought from every Christian breast ;) but as the order,
method, end, and necessity of events, are, for the most part,
hidden in the counsel of God, though it is certain that they
are produced by the will of God, they have the appearance
of being fortuitous, such being the form under which they
present themselves to us, whether considered in their own
nature, or estimated according to our knowledge and judg
ment. Let us suppose, for example, that a merchant, after
entering a forest in company with trust-worthy individuals,
imprudently strays from his companions, and wanders be
wildered till he falls into a den of robbers and is murdered.
His death was not only foreseen by the eye of God, but had
been fixed by his decree. For it is said, not that he foresaw
how far the life of each individual should extend, but that
he determined and fixed the bounds, which could not be
passed, (Job xiv. 5.) Still, in relation to our capacity of
discernment, all these things appear fortuitous. How will