(α) Synods.
Synods as a part of the machinery of the Church grew up spontaneously.
The meeting of the ‘Apostles and Elders’ at Jerusalem
(Acts xv.) exemplifies the only way in which a
practical resolution on a matter affecting a number of persons with
independent rights can possibly be arrived at, viz., by mutual
discussion and agreement. Long before the age of Athanasius it had been
recognised in the Church that the bishops were the persons exclusively
entitled to represent their flocks for such a purpose; in other words,
Councils of bishops had come to constitute the legislative and judicial
body in the Church (Eus. V. C. i. 51). Both of these functions,
and especially the latter, involved the further prerogative of judging
of doctrine, as in the case of Paul of Samosata. But the whole system
had grown up out of occasional emergencies, and no recognised laws
existed to define the extent of conciliar authority, or the relations
between one Council and another should their decisions conflict. Not
even the area covered by the jurisdiction of a given Council was
defined (Can. Nic. 5). We see a Synod at Arles deciding a case
affecting Africa, and reviewing the decision of a previous Synod at
Rome; a Council at Tyre trying the case of a bishop of Alexandria; a
Council at Sardica in the West deposing bishops in the East, and
restoring those whom Eastern Synods had deposed; we find Acacius and
his fellows deposed at Seleucia, then in a few weeks deposing their
deposers at Constantinople; Meletius appointed and deposed by the same
Synod at Antioch in 361, and in the following year resuming his see
without question. All is chaos. The extent to which a Synod succeeds in
enforcing its decisions depends on the extent to which it obtains de
facto recognition. The canons of the Council of Antioch (341) are
accepted as Church law, while its creeds are condemned as Arian (de
Syn. 22–25).