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from the premises allows him, he lays it down that God’s Ungeneracy is expressive of God’s
life. But to make quite plain his delusion upon this subject, let us look at it in the following
way; I mean, let us examine whether, by employing the same method by which he, in the
case of the Father, has brought the definition of the substance to ungeneracy, we may not
equally bring the substance of the Son to ungeneracy.
He says, “The Life that is the same, and thoroughly single, must have one and the same
outward expression for it, even though in mere names, and manner, and order it may seem
to vary. For true expressions derive their precision from the subject realities which they in-
dicate; different expressions are applied to different realities, the same to the same; and so
one or other of these two things must of necessity be held; either that the reality indicated
is quite different (if the expressions are), or else that the indicating expressions are not dif-
ferent;” and there is in this case no other subject reality besides the life of the Son, “for one
either to rest an idea upon, or to cast a different expression upon.” Is there, I may ask, any
unfitness in the words quoted, which would prevent them being rightly spoken or written
about the Only-begotten? Is not the Son Himself also a “Life thoroughly single”? Is there
not for Him also “one and the same” befitting “expression,” “though in mere names, and
manner, and order He may seem to vary”? Must not, for Him also, “one or other of these
two things be held” fixed, “either that the reality indicated is quite different, or else that the
indicating expressions are not different,” there being no other subject reality, besides his
life, “for one either to rest an idea upon, or to cast a different expression upon”? We mix up
nothing here with what Eunomius has said about the Father; we have only passed from the
same accepted premise to the same conclusion as he did, merely inserting the Son’s name
instead. If, then, the Son too is a single life, unadulterated, removed from every sort of
compositeness or complication, and there is no subject reality besides this life of the Son
(for how in that which is simple can the mixture of anything foreign be suspected? what we
have to think of along with something else is no longer simple), and if the Father’s substance
also is a single life, and of this single life, by virtue of its very life and its very singleness,
there are no differences, no increase or decrease in quantity or quality in it creating any
variation, it needs must be that things thus coinciding in idea should be called by the same
appellation also. If, that is, the thing that is detected both in the Father and the Son, I mean
the singleness of life, is one, the very idea of singleness excluding, as we have said, any vari-
ation, it needs must be that the name befitting the one should be attached to the other also.
For as that which reasons, and is mortal, and is capable of thought and knowledge, is called
“man” equally in the case of Adam and of Abel, and this name of the nature is not altered
either by the fact that Abel passed into existence by generation, or by the fact that Adam
did so without generation, so, if the simplicity1193 and incompositeness of the Father’s life
1193 Reading εἴπερ τὸ ἁπλοῦν with the editt., which is manifestly required by the sense.
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.