Section I.
God’s moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy.
Having considered the first thing proposed, relating to that freedom of Will
which Arminians maintain; namely, Whether any such thing does, ever did, or
ever can exist, I come now to the second thing proposed to be the subject of
inquiry, viz. Whether any such kind of liberty be requisite to moral agency,
virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment, &c.
I shall begin with some consideration
of the virtue and agency of the Supreme moral Agent, and Fountain of all Agency
and Virtue.
Dr. Whitby in his Discourse on the
five Points, (p. 14.) says, “If all human actions are necessary, virtue and
vice must be empty names; we being capable of nothing that is blameworthy, or
deserveth praise; for who can blame a person for doing only what he could not
help, or judge that he deserveth praise only for what he could not avoid?” To
the like purpose he speaks in places innumerable; especially in his Discourse
on the Freedom of the Will; constantly maintaining, that a freedom not only
from coaction, but necessity, is absolutely requisite, in order to actions being
either worthy of blame, or deserving of praise. And to this agrees, as is well
known, the current doctrine of Arminian writers, who, in general, hold, that
there is no virtue or vice, reward or punishment, nothing to be commended or
blamed, without this freedom. And yet Dr. Whitby (p. 300.) allows, that God
is without this freedom; and, Arminians, so far as I have had opportunity to
observe, generally acknowledge, that God is necessarily holy, and his will necessarily
determined to that which is good.
So that, putting these things together,
the infinitely holy God — who always used to be esteemed by God’s people not
only virtuous, but a Being in whom is all possible virtue, in the most absolute
purity and perfection, brightness and amiableness; the most perfect pattern
of virtue, and from whom all the virtue of others is but as beams from the sun;
and who has been supposed to be, (being thus every where represented in Scripture,)
on the account of his virtue and holiness, infinitely more worthy to be esteemed,
loved, honoured, admired, commended, extolled, and praised, than any creature
— this Being, according to this notion of Dr. Whitby, and other Arminians,
has no virtue at all; virtue, when ascribed to him, is but an empty name; and
he is deserving of no commendation or praise; because he is under necessity,
he cannot avoid being holy and good as he is; therefore no thanks to him for
it. It seems, the holiness, justice, faithfulness, &c. of the Most High, must
not be accounted to be of the nature of that which is virtuous and praiseworthy.
They will not deny, that these things in God are good; but then we must understand
them, that they are no more virtuous, or of the nature of any thing commendable,
than the good that is in any other being that is not a moral agent as the brightness
of the sun, and the fertility of the earth, are good, but not virtuous, because
these properties are necessary to these bodies, and not the fruit of self-determining
power.
There needs no other confutation of
this notion, to Christians acquainted with the Bible, but only stating and particularly
representing it. To bring texts of Scripture, wherein God is represented, as
in every respect, in the highest manner virtuous, and supremely praiseworthy,
would be endless, and is altogether needless to such as have been brought up
in the light of the gospel.
It were to be wished, that Dr. Whitby
and other divines of the same sort, had explained themselves, when they have
asserted, that that which is necessary, is not deserving of praise; at the same
time that they have owned God’s perfection to be necessary, and so in effect
representing God as not deserving praise. Certainly, if their words have any
meaning at all, by praise, they must mean the exercise or testimony of esteem,
respect, or honourable regard. And will they then say, that men are worthy of
that esteem, respect, and honour for their virtue, small and imperfect as it
is, which yet God is not worthy of, for his infinite righteousness, holiness,
and goodness? If so, it must be, because of some sort of peculiar excellency
in the virtuous man, which is his prerogative, wherein he really has the preference;
some dignity, that is entirely distinguished from any Excellency or amiableness
in God; not in dependence, but in pre-eminence; which therefore he does not
receive from God, nor is God the fountain or pattern of it; nor can God, in
that respect, stand in competition with him, as the object of honour and regard;
but man may claim a peculiar esteem, commendation, and glory, to which God can
have no pretension. Yea, God has no right, by virtue of his necessary holiness,
to intermeddle with that grateful respect and praise, due to the virtuous man,
who chooses virtue, in the exercise of a freedom
ad utrumque
; any more
than a precious stone, which cannot avoid being hard and beautiful.
And if it be so, let it be explained
what that peculiar respect is, that is due to the virtuous man, which differs
in nature and kind, in some way of pre-eminence, from all that is due to God.
What is the name or description of that peculiar affection? Is it esteem, love,
admiration, honour, praise, or gratitude? The Scripture every where represents
God as the highest object of all these: there we read of the soul magnifying
the Lord, of “loving him with all the heart, with all the soul, with all the
mind, and with all the strength;” admiring him, and his righteous acts, or greatly
regarding them, as marvelous and wonderful; honouring, glorifying, exalting,
extolling, blessing, thanking, and praising him; giving unto him all the glory
of the good which is done or received, rather than unto men; “that no flesh
should glory in his presence;” but that he should be regarded as the Being to
whom all glory is due. What then is that respect? What passion, affection, or
exercise is it, that Arminians call praise, diverse from all these things, which
men are worthy of for their virtue, and which God is not worthy of, in any degree?
If that necessity which attends God’s
moral perfections and actions, be as inconsistent with being worthy of praise,
as a necessity of co-action; as is plainly implied in, or inferred from, Dr.
Whitby’s discourse; then why should we thank God for his goodness, any more
than if he were forced to be good, or any more than we should thank one of our
fellow-creatures who did us good, not freely, and of good will, or from any
kindness of heart, but from mere compulsion, or extrinsical necessity? Arminians
suppose, that God is necessarily a good and gracious being; for this they make
the ground of some of their main arguments against many doctrines maintained
by Calvinists; they say, these are certainly false, and it is impossible they
should be true, because they are not consistent with the goodness of God. This
supposes, that it is impossible but that God should be good: for if it be possible
that he should be otherwise, then that impossibility of the truth of these doctrines
ceases according to their own argument.
That virtue in God is not, in the most
proper sense, rewardable, is not for want of merit in his moral perfections
and actions, sufficient to deserve rewards from his creatures; but because
he is infinitely above all capacity of receiving any reward. He is already infinitely
and unchangeably happy, and we cannot be profitable unto him. But still he is
worthy of our supreme benevolence for his virtue: and would be worthy of our
beneficence, which is the fruit and expression of benevolence, if our goodness
could extend to him. If God deserves to be thanked and praised for his goodness,
he would, for the same reason, deserve that we should also requite his kindness,
if that were possible. “What shall I render unto the Lord for all his benefits?”
is the natural language of thankfulness: and so far as in us lies, it is our
duty to render again according to benefits received. And that we might have
opportunity for so natural an expression of our gratitude to God, as beneficence,
notwithstanding his being infinitely above our reach, he has appointed others
to be his receivers, and to stand in his stead, as the objects of our beneficence;
such are especially our indigent brethren.