in it. Such a choice is made for no good end; being made for no end at all. If it were for any
end, the view of the end would be the Motive exciting to the act; and if the act be for no
good end, and so from no good aim, then there is no good intention in it: and, therefore,
according to all our natural notions of virtue, no more virtue in it than in the motion of the
smoke, which is driven to and fro by the wind, without any aim or end in the thing moved,
and which knows not whither, nor wherefore, it is moved.
Corol. 1. By these things it appears, that the argument against the Calvinists, taken from
the use of counsels, exhortations, invitations, expostulations, &c. so much insisted on by
Arminians, is truly against themselves. For these thing’s can operate no other way to any
good effect, than as in them is exhibited Motive and Inducement, tending to excite and de-
termine the acts of the Will. 135 But it follows, on their principles, that the acts of Will excited
135 The true reason why counsels, exhortations, &c. commonly called motives, are consistent with the doctrine
of necessity held by Calvinists, may be here noticed, in addition to some hints before given. In order to this, we
must guard against ambiguity in the word “motive,” which at one time is intended for the object exhibited, ab-
stractedly considered: at another, the object concretively, as it stands in the view of the mind. The opposers of
that necessity for which our author pleads must in order to make even a show of consistency, understand the
word “motive” in the first of these acceptations. And if so, it is nothing marvellous that they should maintain
the existence of a power in the human mind which can, on the one hand, successfully oppose the strongest
possible motive; an don the other, be determined by a weaker, and even sometimes by the weakest motive. For
how often is the most insignificant bauble preferred to infinite excellence! But consistent Calvinists do not un-
derstand the term in any such manner, but rather as an effect compounded of the state of the mind and the real
object. And, seeing the object, in itself considered, is not changed by mental perception, the difference of the
effect, or change of mental view, must arise from the mind itself. Hence one motive, in the Arminian sense, may
produce, in the other acceptation of the term, a thousand different motives, according to the different mental
states to which the object is presented. Therefore counsels, exhortations, invitations, &c. are most rationally
employed by Calvinists; for that which determines the human will to action, is the motive as it is perceived, or
that which results from an application of the object to the mind. According to them, without an object presented
there can be no motive, anymore than there can be a motive without a mind to which it is presented. Without
evangelical truth, and an evangelical mind, or disposition, there can be no evangelical determining motive.
Consequently, if the mind be at all roused from ignorance and apathy, determining motives must be produced
in it by a representation of objects, by counsels, exhortations, invitations, expostulations, &c. These will succeed,
or fail of success, morally, according to the state of the mind. But as the agent is free from co-action, constraint,
and compulsion, in the act of choosing, the true inferences—not that such use of the means is unsuitable or in-
consistent, but—that here is clearly implied the great necessity, the rationality, and the perfect consistency of
prayer to the God of grace, for success on the use of means. Paul may plant, and Apollos may water, but God
giveth the increase. To influence the mind without moral motives, is the prerogative of God. All hearts are in
his hand to form them as he pleases. If the tree be good by sovereign influence, or a new birth, the fruit of love
to God and hatred to sin, holy fear, unfeigned faith, humble hope, &c. will follow, according to the objects
667
SECTION VII. Arminian notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all influence…