SECT. VII.
Arminian notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all Influence of Motive and Induce-
ment, in either virtuous or vicious actions.
As Arminian notions of that liberty which is essential to virtue or vice, are inconsistent
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with common sense, in their being inconsistent with all virtuous or vicious habits and dis-
positions; so they are no less inconsistent with all influence of Motives in moral ac-
tions.—Such influence equally against those notions of liberty, whether there be, previous
to the act of choice, a preponderancy of the inclination, or a preponderancy of those circum-
stances, which have a tendency to move the inclination. And, indeed, it comes to just the
same thing: to say, the circumstances of the mind are such as tend to sway and turn its in-
clination one way, is the same thing, as to say, the inclination of the mind, as under such
circumstances, tends that way.
Or if any think it most proper to say, that Motives do alter the inclination, and give a
net bias to the mind, it will not alter the case, as to the present argument. For if Motives
operate by giving the mind an inclination, then they operate by destroying the mind’s indif-
ference, and laying it under a bias. But to do this, is to destroy the Arminian freedom: it is
not to leave the Will to its own self-determination, but to bring it into subjection to the
power of something extrinsic, which operates upon it, sways and determines it, previous to
its own determination. So that what is done from Motive, cannot he either virtuous or vicious.
Besides, if the acts of the Will are excited by Motives, those Motives are the causes of those
acts of the Will; which makes the acts of the Will necessary; as effects necessarily follow the
efficiency of the cause. And if the influence and power of the Motive causes the volition,
then the influence of the Motive determines volition, and volition does not determine itself;
and so is not free, in the sense of Arminians, (as has been largely shown already,) and con-
sequently can be neither virtuous nor vicious.
The supposition which has already been taken notice of as an insufficient evasion in
other cases, would be, in like manner, impertinently alleged in this case; namely, the suppos-
ition that liberty consist in a power of suspending action for the present, in order to deliber-
ation. If it should be said, Though it be true, that the Will is under a necessity of finally fol-
lowing the strongest Motive; yet it may, for the present, forbear to act upon the Motive
presented, till there has been opportunity thoroughly to consider it, and compare its real
weight with the merit of other Motives. I answer as follows:
Here again, it must be remembered, that if determining thus to suspend and consider,
be that act of the Will, wherein alone liberty is exercised, then in this all virtue and vice must
consist; and the acts that follow this consideration, and are the effects of it, being necessary,
are no more virtuous or vicious than some good or bad events, which happen when they
are fast asleep, and are the consequences of what they did when they were awake. Therefore,
I would here observe two things:
SECTION VII. Arminian notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all influence of Motive and Inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actions.
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SECTION VII. Arminian notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all influence…