virtuous disposition, appearing in love to holiness in the creature, is to be resolved into the
same thing with love to himself. And consequently, whereinsoever he makes virtue his end,
he makes himself his end. In fine, God being as it were an all-comprehending Being, all his
moral perfections—his holiness, justice, grace, and benevolence—are some way or other to
be resolved into a supreme and infinite regard to himself; and if so, it will be easy to suppose
that it becomes him to make himself his supreme and last end in his works.
I would here observe, by the way, that if any insist that it becomes God to love and take
delight in the virtue of his creatures for its own sake, in such a manner as not to love it from
regard to himself; this will contradict a former objection against God taking pleasure in
communications of himself; viz. that inasmuch as God is perfectly independent and self-
sufficient, therefore all his happiness and pleasure consists in the enjoyment of himself. So
that if the same persons make both objections, they must be inconsistent with themselves.
2. I would observe, that it is not unworthy of God to take pleasure in that which is in
itself fit and amiable, even in those that are infinitely below him. If there be infinite grace
and condescension in it, yet these are not unworthy of God, but infinitely to his honor and
glory.
They who insist, that God’s own glory was not an ultimate end of his creation of the
world; but the happiness of his creatures: do it under a color of exalting God’s benevolence
to his creatures. But if his love to them be so great, and he so highly values them as to look
upon them worthy to be his end in all his great works, as they suppose; they are not consistent
with themselves, in supposing that God has so little value for their love and esteem. For as
the nature of love, especially great love, causes him that loves to value the esteem of the
person beloved, so, that God should take pleasure in the creature’s just love and esteem, will
follow from God’s love both to himself and to his creatures. If he esteem and love himself,
he must approve of esteem and love to himself, and disapprove the contrary. And if he loves
and values the creature, he must value and take delight in their mutual love and esteem.
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3. As to what is alleged, that it is unworthy of great men to be governed in their conduct
and achievements by a regard to the applause of the populace; I would observe, What makes
their applause worthy of so little regard, is their ignorance, giddiness, and injustice. The
applause of the multitude very frequently is not founded on any just view of things, but on
humor, mistake, folly, and unreasonable affections. Such applause deserves to be disreg-
arded.—But it is not beneath a man of great dignity and wisdom, to value the wise and just
esteem of others, however inferior to him. The contrary, instead of being an expression of
greatness of mind, would show a haughty and mean spirit. It is such an esteem in his
creatures, that God regards; for, such an esteem only is fit and amiable in itself.
OBJECT. IV. To suppose that God makes himself his ultimate end in the creation of
the world, derogates from the freeness of his goodness, in his beneficence to his creatures;
and from their obligations to gratitude for the good communicated. For if God, in commu-
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SECTION IV. Some objections considered.