We learn from this canon, there were cases in which an ambitious prelate, “by making application to the government” (“secular powers”) had obtained what are called “pragmatic letters,” and employed them for the purpose of “dividing one province into two,” and exalting himself as a metropolitan. The name of a “pragmatic sanction” is more familiar in regard to medieval and modern history; it recalls the name of St. Louis, and, still more, that of the Emperor Charles VI. the father of Maria Theresa. Properly a “pragmatic” was a deliberate order promulgated by the Emperor after full hearing of advice, on some public affair. We find “pragmatici nostri statuta” in a law of a.d. 431. (Cod. Theod., xi. 1, 36); and “pragmatici prioris,” “sub hac pragmatica jussione,” in ordinances in Append. to Cod. Theod., pp. 95, 162; and the empress Pulcheria, about a year before the Council, had informed Leo that her husband Marcian had recalled some exiled orthodox bishops “robore pragmatici sui” (Leon., Epist. lxxvij.). Justinian speaks of “pragmaticas nostras formas” and “pragmaticum typum” (Novel., 7, 9, etc.). The phrase was adopted from his legislation by Louis the Pious and his colleague-son Lothar (compare Novel. 7, 2 with Pertz, Mon. Germ, Hist. Leg., i., 254), and hence it came to be used both by later German emperors (see, e.g., Bryce’s Holy Roman Empire, p. 212), and by the French kings (Kitchin, Hist. France, i. 343, 544). Augustine explains it by “præceptum imperatoris” (Brev. Collat. cum Donatist. iii., 2), and Balsamon in his comment uses an equivalent phrase; and so in the record of the fourth session of Chalcedon we have θεῖα γράμματα (“divine” being practically equivalent to “imperial”) explained by πραγματικοὺς τύπους (Mansi, vii., 89). We must observe that the imperial order, in the cases contemplated by the canon, had only conferred the title of “metropolis” on the city, and had not professed to divide the province for civil, much less for ecclesiastical, purposes. Valens, indeed, had divided the province of Cappadocia, when in 371 he made Tyana a metropolis: and therefore Anthimus, bishop of Tyana, when he claimed the position of a metropolitan, with authority over suffragans, was making a not unnatural inference in regard to ecclesiastical limits from political rearrangements of territory, as Gregory of Nazianzus says (Orat. xliii., 58), whereas Basil “held to the old custom,” i.e., to the traditional unity of his provincial church, although after a while he submitted to what he could not hinder (see Tillemont, ix., 175, 182, 670). But in the case of Eustathius of Berytus, which was clearly in the Council’s mind, the Phœnician province had not been divided; it was in reliance on a mere title bestowed upon his city, and also on an alleged synodical ordinance which issued in fact from the so-called “Home Synod” that he declared himself independent of his metropolitan, Photius of Tyre, and brought six bishoprics under his assumed jurisdiction. Thus while the province remained politically one, he had de facto divided it ecclesiastically into two. Photius petitioned Marcian, who referred the case to the Council of Chalcedon, and it was taken up in the fourth session. The imperial commissioners announced that it was to be settled not according to “pragmatic forms,” but according to those which had been enacted by the Fathers (Mansi, vii., 89). This encouraged the Council to say, “A pragmatic can have no force against the canons.” The commissioners asked whether it was lawful for bishops, on the ground of a pragmatic, to steal away the rights of other churches? The answer was explicit: “No, it is against the canon.” The Council proceeded to cancel the resolution of the Home Synod in favour of the elevation of Berytus, ordered the 4th Nicene canon to be read, and upheld the metropolitical rights of Tyre. The commissioners also pronounced against Eustathius. Cecropius, bishop of Sebastopolis, requested them to put an end to the issue of pragmatics made to the detriment of the canons; the Council echoed this request; and the commissioners granted it by declaring that the canons should everywhere stand good (Mansi, vii., 89–97). We may connect with this incident a law of Marcian dated in 454, by which “all pragmatic sanctions, obtained by means of favour or ambition in opposition to the canon of the Church, are declared to be deprived of effect” (Cod. Justin, i., 2, 12).