power exerted, and in circumstances sufficient to produce an effect, and so the effect be ac-
tually produced at one time; all these things concurring, will produce the effect at all times.
And so we may turn it the other way; that which proves not sufficient at one time, cannot
he sufficient at another, with precisely the same influential circumstances. And therefore if
the effect follows, it is not owing to that cause; unless the different time be a circumstance
which has influence: but that is contrary to the supposition; for it is supposed that all cir-
cumstances that have influence, are the same. And besides, this would be to suppose the
time to be the cause; which is contrary to the supposition of the other thing being the cause.
But if merely diversity of time has no influence, then it is evident that it is as much of an
absurdity to say, the cause was sufficient to produce the effect at one time, and not at another;
as to say, that it is sufficient to produce the effect at a certain time, and yet not sufficient to
produce the same effect at the same time.
On the whole, it is clearly manifest, that every effect has a necessary connexion with its
cause, or with that which is the true ground and reason of its existence. And therefore, if
there be no event without a cause, as was proved before, then no event whatsoever is contin-
gent, in the manner that Arminians suppose the free acts of the Will to be contingent.
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SECTION VIII. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite…