Now the meaning of
“life” and “death” is manifold, and not always
understood in the same way. For as regards the flesh, the energy and
motion of the bodily senses is called “life,” and their
extinction and dissolution is named “death.” But in the
case of the intellectual nature, approximation to the Divine is the
true life, and decadence therefrom is named “death”: for
which reason the original evil, the devil, is called both
“death,” and the inventor of death: and he is also said by
the Apostle to have the power of death Cf. Heb. ii. 14. As,
then, we obtain, as has been said, from the Scriptures, a twofold
conception of death, He Who is truly unchangeable and immutable
“alone hath immortality,” and dwells in light that cannot
be attained or approached by the darkness of wickedness Cf. 1 Tim. iii. 16.: but all things that participate in death,
being far removed from immortality by their contrary tendency, if they
fall away from that which is good, would, by the mutability of their
nature, admit community with the worse condition, which is nothing else
than death, having a certain correspondence with the death of the body.
For as in that case the extinction of the activities of nature is
called death, so also, in the case of the intellectual being, the
absence of motion towards the good is death and departure from life; so
that what we perceive in the bodiless creation i.e.the order of spiritual beings,
including angels and human souls. Of these S. Gregory argues that they
are capable of an ἀκινησία
πρὸς τὸ
ἀγαθόν which is
death in them, as the absence of motion and sense is bodily
death: and that they may therefore be said to have an end, as they had
a beginning: so far as they are eternal it is not by their own
power, but by their mutable nature being upheld by grace from this
state of ἀκινησία
πρὸς τὸ
ἀγαθόν. On both
these grounds therefore—that they have an end, and that
such eternity as they possess is not inherent, but given ab
extra, and contingent—he says they are not properly eternal,
and he therefore rejects the proposed parallel. does
not clash with our argument, which refutes the doctrine of heresy. For
that form of death which corresponds to the intellectual nature (that
is, separation from God, Whom we call Life) is, potentially, not
separated even from their nature; for their emergence from
non-existence shows mutability of nature; and that to which change is
in affinity is hindered from participation in the contrary state by the
grace of Him Who strengthens it: it does not abide in the good by its
own nature: and such a thing is not eternal. If, then, one really
speaks truth in saying that we ought not to estimate the Divine essence
and the created nature in the same way, nor to circumscribe the being
of the Son of God by any beginning, lest, if this be granted, the other
attributes of creation should enter in together with our acknowledgment
of this one, the absurd character of the teaching of that man, who
employs the attributes of creation to separate the Only-begotten God
from the eternity of the Father, is clearly shown. For as none other of
the marks which characterize the creation appears in the Maker of the
creation, so neither is the fact that the creation has its existence
from some beginning a proof that the Son was not always in the
Father,—that Son, Who is Wisdom, and Power, and Light, and Life,
and all that is conceived of in the bosom of the Father.