more force in it, than a like argument has to prove, that if men by a course of nature continue
wicked, or remain without goodness, after they have by vicious acts contracted vicious
habits, and so made themselves wicked, it makes him, who is the cause of their continuance
in being, and the cause of the continuance of the course of nature, to be the cause of their
continued wickedness. Dr. T. says, 143 “God would not make any thing that is hateful to him;
because, by the very terms, he would hate to make such a thing.” But if this be good arguing
in the case to which it is applied, may I not as well say, God would not continue a thing in
being that is hateful to him; because, by the very terms, he would hate to continue such a thing
in being? I think, the very terms do as much (and no more) infer one of these propositions,
as the other. In like manner, the rest that he says on that head may be shown to be unreas-
onable, by only substituting the word continue, in the place of make and propagate. I may
fairly imitate his way of reasoning thus: to say, God continues us according to his own ori-
ginal decree, or law of continuation, which obliges him to continue us in a manner he abhors,
is really to make bad worse: for it is supposing him to be defective in wisdom, or by his own
decree or law to lay such a constraint upon his own actions, that he cannot do what he
would, but is continually doing what he would not, what he hates to do, and what he con-
demns in us; viz. continuing us sinful when he condemns us for continuing ourselves sinful.”
If the reasoning be weak in the one case, it is no less so in the other.
If any shall still insist, that there is a difference between God so disposing things, as that
depravity of heart shall be continued, according to the settled course of nature, in the same
person, who has by his own fault introduced it; and his so disposing as that men, according
to a course of nature, should be born with depravity, in consequence of Adam’s introducing
of sin, by his act which we had no concern in, and cannot be justly charged with: on this I
would observe, that it is quite going off the objection, which we have been upon, from God’s
agency, and flying to another. It is then no longer insisted on, that simply for him, from
whose agency the course of nature and our existence derive, so to dispose things as that we
should have existence in a corrupt state, is for him to be the author of sin: but the plea now
advanced is, that it is not proper and just for such an agent so to dispose, in this case, and
only in consequence of Adam’s sin; it not being just to charge Adam’s sin to his posterity.
And this matter shall be particularly considered, in answer to the next objection; to which
I now proceed.
143 Page 136. S.
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CHAPTER II. God not the Author of Sin.