But I feel that my argument is
running away with me, for it does not remain in the regular course,
but, like some hot-blooded and spirited colt, is carried away by the
blasphemies of our opponents to range over the absurdities of their
system. Accordingly we must restrain it when it would run wild beyond
the bounds of moderation in demonstration of absurd consequences. But
the kindly reader will doubtless pardon what we have said, not imputing
the absurdity that emerges from our investigation to us, but to those
who laid down such mischievous premises. We must, however, now transfer
our attention to another of his statements. For he says that our God also
is composite, in that while we suppose the Light to be common, we yet
separate the one Light from the other by certain special attributes and
various differences. For that is none the less composite which, while
united by one common nature, is yet separated by certain differences
and conjunctions of peculiarities It is
not clear how far the preceding sentences are an exact reproduction of
Eunomius: they are probably a summary of his argument.. To this our
answer is short and easily dismissed. For what he brings as matter of
accusation against our doctrines we acknowledge against ourselves, if
he is not found to establish the same position by his own words. Let us
just consider what he has written. He calls the Lord “true”
Light, and the Father Light “unapproachable.” Accordingly,
by thus naming each, he also acknowledges their community in respect to
light. But as titles are applied to things because they fit them, as he
has often insisted, we do not conceive that the name of
“light” is used of the Divine Nature barely, apart from
some meaning, but rather that it is predicated by virtue of some
underlying reality. Accordingly, by the use of a common name, they
recognize the identity of the objects signified, since they have
already declared that the natures of those things which have the same
name cannot be different. Since, then, the meaning of
“Light” is one and the same, the addition of
“unapproachable” and “true,” according to the
language of heresy, separates the common nature by specific
differences, so that the Light of the Father is conceived as one thing,
and the Light of the Son as another, separated one from the other by
special properties. Let him, then, either overthrow his own positions
to avoid making out by his statements that the Deity is composite, or
let him abstain from charging against us what he may see contained in
his own language. For our statement does not hereby violate the
simplicity of the Godhead, since community and specific difference are
not essence, so that the conjunction of these should render the subject
composite Oehler’s punctuation seems rather to obscure the
sense.. But on the one side the essence by
itself remains whatever it is in nature, being what it is, while, on
the other, every one possessed of reason would say that
these—community and specific difference—were among the
accompanying conceptions and attributes: since even in us men there may
be discerned some community with the Divine Nature, but Divinity is not
the more on that account humanity, or humanity Divinity. For while we
believe that God is good, we also find this character predicated of men
in Scripture. But the special signification in each case establishes a
distinction in the community arising from the use of the homonymous
term. For He Who is the fountain of goodness is named from it; but he
who has some share of goodness also partakes in the name, and God is
not for this reason composite, that He shares with men the title of
“good.” From these considerations it must obviously be
allowed that the idea of community is one thing, and that of essence
another, and we are not on that account any the more to maintain
composition or multiplicity of parts in that simple Nature which has
nothing to do with quantity, because some of the attributes we
contemplate in It are either regarded as special, or have a sort of
common significance.