Thou art. Therefore was I repelled by Thee, and Thou resistedst my changeable stiffnecked-
ness; and I imagined corporeal forms, and, being flesh, I accused flesh, and, being “a wind
that passeth away,”337 I returned not to Thee, but went wandering and wandering on towards
those things that have no being, neither in Thee, nor in me, nor in the body. Neither were
they created for me by Thy truth, but conceived by my vain conceit out of corporeal things.
And I used to ask Thy faithful little ones, my fellow-citizens,—from whom I unconsciously
stood exiled,—I used flippantly and foolishly to ask, “Why, then, doth the soul which God
created err?” But I would not permit any one to ask me, “Why, then, doth God err?” And I
contended that Thy immutable substance erred of constraint, rather than admit that my
mutable substance had gone astray of free will, and erred as a punishment.338
337 Ps. lxxviii. 39.
338 It may assist those unacquainted with Augustin’s writings to understand the last three sections, if we set
before them a brief view of the Manichæan speculations as to the good and evil principles, and the nature of the
human soul:—(1) The Manichæans believed that there were two principles or substances, one good and the
other evil, and that both were eternal and opposed one to the other. The good principle they called God, and
the evil, matter or Hyle (Con. Faust. xxi. 1, 2). Faustus, in his argument with Augustin, admits that they sometimes
called the evil nature “God,” but simply as a conventional usage. Augustin says thereon (ibid. sec. 4): “Faustus
glibly defends himself by saying, ‘We speak not of two gods, but of God and Hyle;’ but when you ask for the
meaning of Hyle, you find that it is in fact another god. If the Manichæans gave the name of Hyle, as the ancients
did, to the unformed matter which is susceptible of bodily forms, we should not accuse them of making two
gods. But it is pure folly and madness to give to matter the power of forming bodies, or to deny that what has
this power is God.” Augustin alludes in the above passage to the Platonic theory of matter, which, as the late
Dean Mansel has shown us (Gnostic Heresies, Basilides, etc.), resulted after his time in Pantheism, and which
was entirely opposed to the dualism of Manichæus. It is to this “power of forming bodies” claimed for matter,
then, that Augustin alludes in our text (sec. 24) as “not only a substance but real life also.” (2) The human soul
the Manichæans declared to be of the same nature as God, though not created by Him—it having originated in
the intermingling of part of His being with the evil principle, in the conflict between the kingdoms of light and
darkness (in Ps. cxl. sec. 10). Augustin says to Faustus: “You generally call your soul not a temple, but a part or
member of God ” (Con. Faust. xx. 15); and thus, “identifying themselves with the nature and substance of God”
(ibid. xii. 13), they did not refer their sin to themselves, but to the race of darkness, and so did not “prevail over
their sin.” That is, they denied original sin, and asserted that it necessarily resulted from the soul’s contact with
the body. To this Augustin steadily replied, that as the soul was not of the nature of God, but created by Him
and endowed with free will, man was responsible for his transgressions. Again, referring to the Confessions, we
find Augustin speaking consistently with his then belief, when he says that he had not then learned that the soul
was not a “chief and unchangeable good” (sec. 24), or that “it was not that nature of truth” (sec. 25); and that
when he transgressed “he accused flesh” rather than himself; and, as a result of his Manichæan errors (sec. 26),
“contended that God’s immutable substance erred of constraint, rather than admit that his mutable substance
had gone astray of free will, and erred as a punishment.”
148
While Writing, Being Blinded by Corporeal Images, He Failed to Recognise…